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I. POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
1. Overview 
In 1945, the Allied Powers prosecuted individuals at tribunals held in Nuremberg 
and Tokyo for violations of international humanitarian law committed during World War 
II. These prosecutions marked a departure in international law for two reasons. First, it 
was the first time that individuals instead of nations had been successfully held 
accountable for their actions by the international community. Second, it was the first time 
that the international community had supplanted sovereign nations in the capacity of 
prosecuting citizens for criminal acts. In the 1990s, after a gap of over forty years caused 
by the Cold War, the United Nations again took an active role in post-conflict justice 
through the establishment of international criminal tribunals (ICTs) for the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda.  
In July 2002, pursuant to the Rome Treaty of 1998, sixty members of the 
international community established the International Criminal Court (ICC) the main 
purpose of which is to prosecute war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and 
crimes of aggression. The ICC and ICTs have become two of the primary fora for post 
conflict justice. These mechanisms were designed to take the place of national courts in 
the prosecution of the most egregious crimes resulting from internal or international 
armed conflicts.  
National courts in post-conflict environments often suffer from serious defects 
ranging from lack of political will and judicial independence to lack of capacity to 
prosecute complex criminal cases. Moreover, many states have been fo rced to give war 
criminals amnesty for their crimes as a price for peace. Due to these deficiencies, many 
violations of international humanitarian law go unpunished and guilty individuals carry 
on their activities with impunity. Thus, international tribuna ls have been seen as the key 
way to prosecute violations of international humanitarian law when national courts are 
either unwilling or unable to do so.  
At the end of the 20th Century, other post-conflict judicial fora were developed 
that bridge the gap between international fora and their domestic counterparts. In 2000, 
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the international community agreed with the Government of Sierra Leone (GOSL) to 
establish a mixed tribunal to prosecute individuals for violations of international 
humanitarian law during the Sierra Leone Civil War (1991-2002). As the term “mixed” 
suggests, the Special Court for Sierra Leone differs from ICTs and the ICC in that it was 
established not by the United Nations or by international treaty, but by an agreement 
between the GOSL and the UN. Therefore, the Special Court is a hybrid institution that 
has both national and international characteristics. Sierra Leone is not alone in 
establishing a mixed tribunal. Another type of mixed court is currently operating in East 
Timor where the United Nations is assisting the local government in rebuild the judicial 
system. 
This thesis will examine various approaches to post-conflict justice. The strengths 
and weakness of all the approaches will be examined in order to determine the 
effectiveness of post-conflict judicial institutions in terms of the transfer of international 
legal norms, capacity building and the development of international law. This 
effectiveness often depends on the institution itself, but support from the international 
community and post-conflict state is also essential. 
2. Background 
The newly established ICC will operate under the principle of complementarity. 
Complementarity essentially means that the ICC will only assert jurisdiction pursuant to 
an order from the United Nations Security Council, or in those cases where a nation 
cannot or will not prosecute individuals for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law. Therefore primary jurisdiction for post-conflict justice issues will 
typically remain at the state level. Unfortunately, many states recovering from 
international or internal armed conflict do not have the capacity to prosecute individuals 
for international crimes. Thus, in situations where the state has low judicial capacity, the 
ICC will assume cases even when a state has the political will to prosecute individuals.1 
Even then, the ICC will prosecute only the most serious violations of international 
humanitarian law leaving the bulk of accused perpetrators to the national courts. 
Unfortunately, national courts lacking capacity, and sometimes political will, may have 
                                                 
1 The ICC will not have jurisdiction over international crimes that occurred prior to July 2002 in some 
current international and internal armed conflicts, involving countries such as Iraq, the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, and Colombia, but the international community will most likely have an interest in 
seeing justice take place for violations of international humanitarian law in those areas. 
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little choice but to not prosecute (impunity) or grant amnesty in conjunction with some 
form of truth and reconciliation commission.  
The problem is that while purely international justice institutions ensure that 
individuals most responsible for massive violations of international humanitarian law are 
prosecuted, there is typically no complementary international effort at the state level to 
develop the capacity to prosecute lower level figures or to include state authorities in the 
prosecution of cases that should fall within their jurisdiction. Additionally, since the 
international tribunals normally hold their proceedings outside the state where the crimes 
occurred, the proceedings are not visible to the public and do not directly support 
reconciliation efforts. Mixed tribunals such as those in Sierra Leone and East Timor seek 
to address this problem. By examining these various international approaches to post-
conflict justice, this thesis evaluates the extent to which each has succeeded not only in 
bringing criminals to justice, but also to building local capacity and extending 
international law in the process. 
3. Research Question 
In order to analyze approaches to post-conflict justice in states with low capacity, 
the concept of post-conflict justice must be defined and explained. Post-conflict justice 
needs to be distinguished from both transitional justice, as when a state democratizes 
after a period of authoritarianism, and ordinary justice, which takes place in the normal 
functioning of the state. While most states have some form of functioning legal system, in 
many post-conflict cases these legal systems have been compromised by the former 
regime and/or left in shambles by war. Consequently, the international community is 
often urged to establish international tribunals to prosecute serious international crimes. 
With the establishment of the ICC, the international community will have a standing 
institution that will assume jurisdiction over international crimes when states will not or 
cannot prosecute.  
In post-conflict environments, justice institutions are essential to establish 
accountability and reconciliation. However, questions must be asked about the long-term 
impact of the post-conflict justice institution after the international community has moved 
on to the next post-conflict situation. Have international prosecutions helped the justice 
and reconciliation process? Is the domestic perception favorable or unfavorable? Have 
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the international prosecutions left the state with the capacity to investigate and prosecute 
lower level figures responsible for international crimes? In short, post-conflict justice 
institutions must be examined to reveal their long-term impact on the societies they 
profess to assist. 
This thesis explores three international approaches to post-conflict justice. First, it 
considers the unilateral approach, where international institutions act on the international 
level alone.  Then it turns to situations where international and national post-conflict 
justice institutions operate side by side, but independently of one another. Finally the 
thesis studies mixed tribunals, which have adopted a coordinated international/national 
approach, to determine if they effectively incorporate the strengths and negate the 
weaknesses of the purely international approaches. Based on its findings, the thesis will 
outline for an approach to post-conflict justice that capitalizes on using international 
assistance to develop post-conflict justice institutions that prosecute war criminals, 
preserve sovereignty, enhance legitimacy and build national judicial capacity that will 
help strengthen the rule of law in post-conflict environments. 
4. Theory and Methodology 
This thesis will utilize a constructivist perspective that assumes that the liberal 
developments in international criminal justice are positive steps for democracy, human 
rights and the rule of law. The thesis will use the comparative case studies to begin to 
develop a theory of post-conflict justice. The primary research questions will be 
addressed in three stages. First, the basic concepts and issues of post-conflict justice will 
be examined. The historical legacy of the Nuremberg trials will be detailed to show why 
international jus tice and post-conflict judicial institutions are positive steps forward for 
the international system. This stage will also present an overview of the issues related to 
post-conflict justice such as the development of international law and its impact on 
sovereignty and state relations. 
Second, case studies of differing types of institutional approaches will be 
analyzed to discover their effectiveness. The first case studies examine unilateral cases 
where the post-conflict justice is addressed at one level only. The case studies for the 
pure international examples will utilize the ICTY and the ICC. These cases have been 
selected since the focus of these institutions has been (and in the case of the ICC, will be) 
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the enforcement of international justice without necessarily working with or building 
parallel institutions or capabilities on the state level The next case study explores a case 
where efforts at both the international and the national levels to address international 
crimes have been fragmented, with little coordination between the entities. The final set 
of case studies looks at integrated approaches where the international and national 
communities are working closely to build post-conflict judicial institutions that can be 
used to prosecute international crimes and build the capacity of the state to adhere to 
international norms. 
5. Chapter-by-Chapter Summary 
Chapter I: This chapter will begin with a brief introduction including the 
background, research question and methodology. This introduction will flow into a 
discussion on the major issues concerning post-conflict justice. First, post-conflict justice 
will be defined. Then the thesis will explain why the international community demands 
that post-conflict justice mechanisms are put into place as well as the underlying legal 
basis for the establishment of the courts and international crimes. The thesis also 
describes the challenges of holding those guilty of international crimes accountable for 
their actions. Understanding these issues is critical for an appreciation of the tensions that 
exist between those who advocate for a more active international role in post-conflict 
justice and those who believe that the state should have more of a voice in the process.  
Chapter II: This chapter examines unilateral international approaches such as the 
ICTY, which has been important to the development of international post-conflict justice 
over the past decade. The effectiveness of this approach will be scrutinized, because ICTs 
may be used again for conflicts that predate the operative date of the ICC. Then the ICC 
is examined to see how this court is set up to operate. Due to the recent founding of the 
court, evidence from specific cases cannot be examined, however, the structure of the 
court should be able to tell us how the rights of states may be affected. This chapter also 
considers “universal jurisdiction.” Universal jurisdiction is a legal principle that holds 
that certain crimes are so heinous that by their nature, any state has the jurisdiction to 
open proceedings against an accused even if the accused or the crime in question have no 
relation to the state that is bringing the action. 
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Chapter III: The institutions examined here are multilevel in the sense that 
prosecutions are taking place at the internationa l and national levels. In the first case, 
Rwanda, the ICTR has been operating parallel to the national courts and an institution 
known as gacaca, which is a traditional conflict resolution system that has been modified 
to help process the overwhelming number of genocide cases. This chapter will also 
consider several types of mixed or hybrid tribunals. These tribunals result from 
agreements between sovereign states and the international community to develop post-
conflict justice institutions together. The case study on East Timor demonstrates the 
benefits of having the international and state authorities working together, but also points 
out the practical difficulties encountered by an institution that is starved for resources and 
has a limited jurisdictional reach across international boundaries. The final case, Sierra 
Leone, demonstrates the potential for hybrid courts when the state and the international 
community focus their efforts on making such an institution work. 
Chapter IV:  The final chapter will serve as a comparative analysis of the various 
approaches. First the pure cases will be compared with the unintegrated. A tentative 
conclusion is that post-conflict justice on both levels is desirable. Following that 
assessment, the benefits of those approaches will be compared with the integrated 
approaches. The goal here is to determine under what conditions the various approaches 
can or should be pursued by states and the international community. In addition to 
conclusions and recommendations, this chapter will also reiterate the need to incorporate 
post-conflict justice institutions into the overall framework of post-conflict 
reconstruction. 
B. POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE 
1. Conflict, Justice and Accountability 
Despite the growth of legal constraints on the use of armed force, many conflicts 
are still marred by criminal conduct ranging from common looting to atrocities such as 
the massacre of civilians. Thus, one of the most important areas for a state recovering 
from international or internal armed conflict to address is post-conflict justice and 
accountability. The existence of post-conflict justice mechanisms is a positive step 
forward for international human rights and the rule of law. By developing and imposing 
international judicial standards and insisting on the punishment of international crimes, 
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the international community has sent a message that states, governments, rebel groups 
and their leaders cannot indiscriminately and systematically violate international 
humanitarian law and human rights law during international and internal armed conflicts. 
Post-conflict justice as discussed in this thesis will include the issues surrounding the 
prosecution of a relatively small number of individuals in some post-conflict cases to the 
processing of more than 100,000 perpetrators for genocide related crimes in Rwanda.  
The post-conflict judicial and related reconciliation processes are key components 
of the overall post-conflict reconstruction of society but they typically have implications 
that extend beyond the national borders. While these processes are obviously important to 
states recovering from war, in the past decade the international community has asserted 
its own renewed interest in punishing those individuals who are responsible for 
international crimes. This trend of punishing or holding those most responsible for war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and crimes of aggression (hereinafter – 
international crimes) accountable brings together several trends that have been 
developing for at least a century. However, it has only been in the past ten years that the 
forms of international criminal justice have really started to take shape. 
The three trends that have combined to shape post-conflict justice are 
institutionalism, international legalism and post-conflict reconstruction. The confluence 
of these trends has come about, in part, from an increased awareness and concern for the 
human rights of individuals. Institutionalism in this context means the development of 
international judicial organizations such as the International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Hague, the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECHR), the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR), the ICTs 
for Yugoslavia and Rwanda (ICTY and ICTR) and the ICC.  
The historic development of international criminal justice institutions has been an 
important step in addressing human rights abuses by governments and other groups that 
operate in conflict environments. The human rights movement has been able to use the 
recent developments to influence the way nations interact internationally, regionally and 
bilaterally. Through the use of the ICTs and universal jurisdiction, statesmen, activists 
and jurists have been able to shape the way that governments and the international 
community interact with post-conflict regimes. These actors have narrowed the available 
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options of states and the international community to grant immunities and amnesties to 
criminals who have hitherto been able to hide behind official immunities or threats to 
disrupt fragile peace processes. Still these international efforts for redressing international 
crimes have met some resistance from states that perceive an independent and active 
international criminal justice system as an uncontrollable political tool and a threat to 
national sovereignty. 
Developments in international criminal justice and the institutions that have 
resulted are a victory for liberal institutionalists who see the progress made as validation 
of the impact of interna tional organizations and cooperation on international relations. 
They also see a triumph in the proliferation of “universal” norms of human rights, 
democratization and the rule of law. Indeed, the proliferation of ICTs, mixed tribunals, 
universal justice, and the establishment of the ICC signal an increased global 
commitment toward accountability for international crimes. Yet realists who scoff at the 
notion of international institutions should pay attention because recent history suggests 
that the prosecution of war criminals may actually affect the course of conduct that 
nations take in their external and internal activities. Some commentators have welcomed 
the movement for global justice as a needed assault on the institution of state 
sovereignty. 2 Although state sovereignty will continue to be the bedrock of international 
relations, the international community is increasingly demanding that sovereignty be 
exercised responsibly. 3   
International legalism means the development of international legal norms. Legal 
norms include at a minimum an independent judiciary, fair trials, due process, timely 
proceedings, and competent defense attorneys. Moreover, progress in the law of armed 
conflict and human rights law has limited the means, methods and conduct of nations 
(and individuals) when they engage in international and internal armed conflict. These 
developments have affected state sovereignty and constrained policy choices of 
governments. For example, states must be more careful during internal and external 
                                                 
2 Geoffrey Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice, New Press, New 
York, 2001, introduction, p. xxx. 
3 See for example Gene M. Lyons and Michael Mastanduno, Beyond Westphalia?  State Sovereignty 
and International Intervention  (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995) and Francis  M 
Deng, Sadikiel Kimaro, Terrence Lyons, Donald Rothchild, and I. William Zartman, Sovereignty as 
Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1996). 
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warfare, in the treatment of prisoners and in the arenas of civil and human rights due to 
obligations that they have incurred by signing certain treaties and joining organizations 
such as the United Nations. 
Finally, post-conflict reconstruction means those actions taken by states and the 
international community in conjunction with peacekeeping and peace building efforts that 
seek to rebuild and reconstruct societies in the wake of armed conflict. These efforts are 
typically coordinated by a United Nations agency in coordination with other donor states, 
international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), domestic civil society (if it 
exists), the post-conflict state and any UN or regional force that is established to conduct 
security operations in support of the peace building process. 
Prior to the end of the Cold War, the confluence of these three trends in post-
conflict justice was not apparent. The political development of international criminal 
judicial institutions, sometimes described as the Nuremberg legacy, is notable for the lack 
of momentum during the Cold War contrasted against the variety of post-conflict judicial 
institutions developed since the early 1990s. Yet, the legal legacy of post-conflict justice 
as a part of international human rights law and international humanitarian law4 is also 
remarkable due to its continued, but untested, development during the Cold War and the 
rapidity of its growth, influence and application since. Like any area of law and politics, 
the choices that have to be made in the realm of justice and accountability are complex 
and controversial. The consequences of granting amnesties for international crimes or the 
absence of action at the international or national level can, in effect, mean impunity for 
individuals who have  committed atrocities. However, if action is to be taken against 
perpetrators of these criminal acts, the forum selected must be conducted fairly and must 
adhere to international judicial norms and standards.  
Tribunals are the most accepted form of post-conflict justice at both the 
international and national levels. However, a state must have the capacity to try complex 
international crimes cases and possess an independent judiciary that can conduct fair 
trials without undue influence from the government or any other party. If an international 
tribunal is selected as the appropriate forum, the international community must strike a 
                                                 
4 The Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) is a sub part of International Humanitarian Law. 
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balance between achieving justice for the sake of humanity and helping to rehabilitate 
and build the capacity of the post-conflict state where the criminal acts occurred and the 
victims still reside, if post-conflict justice is to survive beyond the tenure of the 
international tribunal.  No matter what form of post-conflict judicial institution is chosen, 
it must reflect certain principles that adhere to international norms such as impartiality, 
independence and fundamental fairness. The tribunal must also be able to be established 
and act in a timely manner for the victims, the defendants and for the post-conflict 
reconstruction process.5 
Although states have the primary right to prosecute their citizens and others who 
commit international crimes on their territory, many post-conflict states lack the 
necessary tools to do so. Typically, legal capacity in terms of experienced personnel; 
physical infrastructure, investigative capability and resources will be poor to non-
existent. Further, in many post-conflict states, international legal norms such as judicial 
independence, due process and an open trial process will have been curtailed if they had 
existed at all. Incompetence, corruption and lack of ability mean that many post-conflict 
states either cannot or will not prosecute individuals for international crimes. 
Post-conflict states have attempted to deal with these incapacities through the 
establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission (TRC). These fora can be very 
useful for the reconciliation process and are often used in coordination with trials either at 
the national or international levels. Unfortunately, TRCs by themselves do not meet 
national or international standards for justice. The establishment of a record through the 
liberal use of amnesties and immunities may help the nation heal but they do not force 
accountable individuals to take full responsibility for their crimes. However, TRCs 
working in tandem with a post-conflict judicial institution can help create a record and 
serve as a forum where low-level war criminals can acknowledge their actions, be held 
accountable and reconcile with their societies. 
2. The Nure mberg Legacy- Accountability 
The realization during the 1990s of international tribunals prosecuting 
international crimes (war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide) can be seem as 
                                                 
5 Human Rights Watch, “Justice for Iraq: A Human Rights Watch Policy Paper,” New York, 
December 2002, <http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/mena/iraq 1217bg.htm> (Feb 27, 2003). 
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the fulfillment of the Nuremberg legacy. The gist of the Nuremberg legacy is that 
individuals responsible for the most heinous and egregious of international crimes would 
be held to account for their actions in a court of law rather than being summarily 
executed as some Allied leaders wanted.6 Of course, the main distinction between the 
prosecutions in 1946 and those of more recent vintage is that tribunals today have largely 
avoided the stigma of being called “victors justice.”  
Today, international criminal tribunals are not pursuing victors’ justice, but global 
justice. This distinction wipes away the charge that the vanquished must suffer justice at 
the whim of the winning side, but it does not take the political element out of the process. 
In fact, politics continues to play a large part in international crimes prosecutions from 
the selection of the type of forum, to funding to the enforcement of the will of the court. 
Therefore, tribunals in The Hague, Arusha, Freetown, and Dili have much more in the 
way of legitimacy, at least on the international level than they have power. 
Directly after World War II a movement arose to set up a permanent international 
criminal court in order to capitalize on the precedent set by the International Military 
Tribunals (IMTs) in Nuremberg and Tokyo. The International Court of Justice had been 
made a part of the UN system, but it only had jurisdiction over states and then only with 
their consent. Therefore, the UN directed the International Law Commission (ILC) to 
draft a statute for a criminal court. Due to the onset of the Cold War, any cooperative 
effort toward fulfilling the Nuremberg legacy disappeared. It was not until after the fall of 
the Iron Curtain and the start of the Balkan wars in the early 1990s that an earnest call for 
an international criminal tribunal went out. 
The first international efforts, the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda (ICTY and ICTR) were established in 1993 and 1994 
respectively. Over their short history they have demonstrated the strengths and 
weaknesses of efforts to bring war criminals to justice. The drive to establish the ICTs 
revived dormant efforts to pursue a standing international criminal court (ICC). The 
revival culminated in a conference in Rome in July 1998 where representatives from 
across the world overwhelmingly voted for the draft Rome Statute that serves as the 
                                                 
6 Churchill and Stalin were advocates of this approach, but were opposed by Roosevelt and his 
Secretary of War, Stimson. Citation needed. See Gary Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of 
International War Crimes Tribunals, Princeton University, New Jersey, 2000, pp. 7-10. 
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underlying treaty and law for the ICC. The treaty then received the necessary sixty 
ratifications in fewer than four years and the Court officially stood up in July 2002. 
Yet the IMTs, ICTs and the ICC are not the only venues for the prosecution of 
international crimes devised by the international community. Since 1999, at least four 
separate mixed or hybrid tribunals have combined international efforts and expertise with 
local legal professionals to bring those most responsible for heinous crimes to justice 
with local judicial actors from the state where the crimes took place. One approach 
typified by the Special Court in Sierra Leone stems from an agreement between the 
Government of Sierra Leone and the United Nations Security Council. 
Another type of mixed tribunal used in East Timor uses Special Panels that 
combine international judges and lawyers from the United Nations and local judges and 
lawyers who have been screened and trained to take a more active role now and a 
permanent role later. These approaches have bolstered the capacity of state actors to 
prosecute such offenses on their own and have allowed international norms to positively 
influence the conduct of the tribunals. 
The Nuremberg legacy has been fulfilled. The various forms of international and 
mixed tribunals have evolved since the resurgence of international criminal law began in 
the early 1990s. The reasons for the different forms are a result of political maneuvering 
and the unwillingness of some states to cede sovereignty and diplomatic options to an 
independent international criminal court. Still, these institutions represent a step away 
from victors’ justice and a step toward a global justice system with norms that reflect 
impartiality, judicial independence and fundamental fairness. To that end, all of these 
institutions stand up to the Nuremberg legacy.  
3. The Law of Post-Conflict Justice 
On the international level, the laws that govern post-conflict justice tribunals are 
derived from two main sources. The first, international humanitarian law (IHL) includes 
the law of armed conflict, composed mainly of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their 
additional Protocols adopted in 1977. This body of law is the basis for most definitions of 
war crimes. The second source, human rights law (HRL), is an outgrowth of universal or 
natural law and war first codified in the 1948 United Nations sponsored Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and in the Genocide Convention that soon followed. Both 
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IHL and HRL initially sought domestic enforcement against individuals or international 
enforcement against states in the tradition of public international law. 7 They were 
traditionally separate and distinct but have merged together over the past 50 years.8 The 
melding of these two regimes has been essential for international judicial mechanisms to 
assert jurisdiction over internal armed conflicts and domestic security operations, conduct 
normally outside the scope of international law. 
International law derives from several sources. First, there is treaty law whereby 
states in return for the benefits of a legal regime in an anarchic international system, 
forfeit some of their sovereignty. The second source of international law is customary 
international law derived from the customs and practices of nations. It is under this 
natural law theory “that some rules of international humanitarian law [and human rights 
law] once considered to involve only the responsibility of states may also be a basis for 
individual criminal responsibility.”9 The final source of international law that is 
important for this discussion is case law such as rulings by the ICTY that have expanded 
the reach of international law into internal armed conflict, these rulings reflecting both 
international treaty law and customary international law10 have in turn been incorporated 
into the ICC’s Rome Statute.11 
The ICC is just the latest international treaty that has incorporated changes to 
international law. Yet, coming as it did at the end of the twentieth century, it was a clear 
                                                 
7 Alex G. Peterson, “Order Out of Chaos: Domestic Enforcement of the Law of Internal Armed 
Conflict,” Military Law Review, Vol. 171, (March 2002) 1-90, 32. The formal confluence of these regimes 
can be traced to at least 1977 with the adoption of “the fair trial provisions of the 1966 International 
Convention on Civil and Political Rights in the two Protocols additional to the Geneva Conventions.” 
8 Campbell, Colin, “Peace and the Laws of War: The Role of International Humanitarian Law in the 
Post-Conflict Environment.” International Review of the Red Cross, No. 839, 30 September 2000. Pp. 627-
651. 
9 Theodor Meron, “War Crimes Law Comes of Age,” American Journal of International Law, Volume 
92, Issue 3 (Jul., 1998) 462-468, 467 Theodor Meron, “War Crimes Law Comes of Age,” American 
Journal of International Law, Volume 92, Issue 3, (Jul., 1998) 462-468, 464. 
10 Kenneth W. Abbott, “International Relations Theory, International Law, and the Regime Governing 
Atrocities in Internal Conflicts,” American Journal of International Law, Vol 93, Issue 2, (Apr., 1999), 
361-379, 378. 
11 Jonathon Charney, “Progress in International Criminal Law?” American Journal of International 
Law, Volume 93, Issue 2, April 1999. Pp. 452-464, 454. “The ICTY and the ICTR have legitimated the 
prosecution of international crimes to the international community and have elaborated on the pertinent law 
through their statutes, rules, and judgments.” He continues by stating, “Throughout these advances 
governments have become accustomed to the idea that international criminal law constitutes a real and 
operative body of law...” 
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statement that the changes that have gone on in the IHL and HRL regimes through treaty, 
customary and case law would be combined under the heading of international criminal 
justice. Writing before the ratification of the ICC in 1998, Professor Theodor Meron 
foresaw that “the probable inclusion in the International Criminal Court of common 
Article 3 [of the Geneva Conventions] and crimes against humanity, the latter divorced 
from a war nexus connotes a certain blending of international humanitarian law with 
human rights law and thus an incremental criminalization of serious violations of human 
rights.”12 
Despite progress toward universal acceptance of these new international legal 
norms, not all nations accept them in total and even when they do, states have let political 
concerns outweigh legal obligations under international law. For example, the United 
States, which was the driving force behind many of the developments in IHL and HRL 
and has supported both the ICTY and ICTR has explicitly exempted itself from both of 
the 1977 additional Protocols and has refused to sign on to the ICC. At the same time, the 
United States has signed up to more than one international treaty that has called for the 
arrest and prosecution of individuals responsible for international crimes such as torture, 
genocide, apartheid and slavery under the concept of universal jurisdiction. 13 
Another issue where the dictates of international law clash with the realpolitik 
concerns of statesmen who are trying to resolve conflict is that of amnesties. Provisions 
in several treaties dealing with crimes such as torture and genocide, for example, have 
placed limits on the ability of sovereign states to act grant or recognize amnesties given 
to leaders who have been or may be accused of international crimes. Historically, peace 
agreements or pacted transitions have given such leaders amnesties in order to guarantee 
a smooth transition during a post-conflict process.14 The price of amnesty is often 
immunity for the actor. However, it is increasingly being recognized that international 
                                                 
12 Meron, p. 468. 
13 Charney, Progress, p. 455. See also The Economist, “Belgium’s Genocide Law: Too 
Embarrassing,” Vol. 367, No. 8320, April 19, 2003, p. 43. The Belgian government bent to US pressure 
and amended a law that allowed for broad prosecutions under universal jurisdiction. 
14 Ruth Wedgewood and Harold J. Jacobson, “Foreword: Symposium: State Reconstruction After 
Civil Conflict,” American Journal of International Law, Vol 95, Issue 1 (Jan., 2001), 1-6, 1-2. Some 
commentators argue that amnesties are an essential tradeoff especially in democratic transitions such as the 
one that occurred in South Africa or in the conclusion of internal conflicts that are resolved through 
negotiation and concession instead of a complete victory by either side. 
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obligations under treaty or universal jurisdiction hamstring the ability of the international 
community to give amnesties.15 States can grant amnesties within their borders, whether 
legal or not in the eyes of the international community, but the individual’s movement is 
limited as he or she will run the risk of arrest and prosecution upon leaving his or her 
home country. 
When states seek to prosecute international crimes such as war crimes, crimes 
against humanity and genocide, they can pursue several different legal avenues. First, 
they can use international law as incorporated into their domestic law as required under 
the terms of a treaty such as the Geneva Conventions.16 This option is logical especially 
for states that have not developed their own body of domestic law for the types of 
conduct covered by international criminal law. The second legal option is for states to 
prosecute the underlying conduct under their own law. For instances where mixed 
tribunals are established, the law used will most likely be a combination of international 
criminal and domestic law, but the international community will insist that whatever law 
is used, it must adhere to international standards.  
For current and future international tribunals the law of post-conflict justice will 
continue to grow as the ICC is established and begins to make case law. Precedents made 
by mixed and ICTs as well as states prosecuting individuals under the theory of universal 
justice will also be influential in the development of international criminal law. Yet states 
will continue to apply both international criminal law and their own rules and laws 
against perpetrators. However, with the growth of an international criminal law 
community and evolving international standards for criminal justice, the international 
community, specifically the ICC will be scrutinizing state actions to ensure that states are 
not conducting sham prosecutions to protect individuals. This scrutiny will further fuel 
the controversy between post-conflict justice and sovereignty. 
 
 
                                                 
15 Carsten Stahn, “United Nations Peace-Building, Amnesties and Alternative Forms of Justice: A 
Change in Practice?” International Review of the Red Cross, Vol 84, No. 845, March 2002, pp. 200-01. At 
the signing of the Lome accord, in July 1999 the SRSG made a verbal disclaimer to his signature stating 
that the amnesty provisions did not apply to international crimes committed during the Sierra Leone 
conflict. 
16 The four Geneva Conventions were signed on 12 August 1949. Obligations are implemented 
through DoD Directive 5100.77, “DoD Law of War Program,” December 9, 1998. 
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4. Post-Conflict Justice and Sovereignty 
Perhaps the most controversial issue to arise in post-conflict judicial situation is 
sovereignty. Despite the erosion of absolute sovereignty through the growth of 
international institutions, organizations and treaty obligations, many nations resent any 
actions perceived as undue international interference in state affairs. Most states assert 
that the primary jurisdiction for the prosecution of international crimes and other 
atrocities belongs with the nation state. This view is supported by international law and 
reflected by the inclusion of the concept of complementarity in the Rome Statute.17 By 
ratifying the Rome Statute and becoming a party to the ICC states have given the court 
the right to make the decision as to whether that will or capacity exists.18 Moreover, 
states of the former Yugoslavia have been forced to turn over nationals to international 
tribunals operating under U.N. Security Council authority. Ultimately, the prosecution of 
state nationals before an international tribunal due to treaty obligation, Security Council 
authorization or under the concept of universal jurisdiction will test the sovereignty of the 
state and the legitimacy of such tribunals in the eyes of the populations of post-conflict 
states. 
The practice and development of international criminal law in particular has 
broken down barriers to prosecuting individuals for criminal acts that were once under 
the exclusive domain of the sovereign state. Sovereignty, once inviolate under the 
Westphalian system, has been eroded significantly since the end of World War II.19 This 
trend  has  caused  some  governments  to see an independent ICC, unaccountable even to 
                                                 
17 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 17. Text of the Rome Statute circulated as 
document A/CONF.183/9 of 17 July 1998 and corrected by process-verbaux of 10 November 1998, 12 July 
1999, 30 November 1999, 8 May 2000, 17 January 2001 and 16 January 2002. Under complementarity, the 
ICC will defer the prosecution of accused war criminals to the state unless the state will not or cannot 
conduct the prosecution on its own. 
18 Sarah B. Sewell and Carl Kaysen, (eds.) The United States and the International Criminal Court: 
National Security and International Law, Rodman and Littlefield, New York, 2000. Page 3 
19 Robertson, p. xxx. Some see sovereignty as an outdated model of international order and that the 
“movement for global justice has been a struggle against sovereignty – the doctrine of non-intervention in 
the internal affairs of nation states asserted by all governments which have refused to subject the treatment 
they mete out to their citizens to any independent external scrutiny.”  
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the UN Security Council, as a menace that would create laws or impose restrictions that 
would impinge upon their national interests even when the prosecution of international 
crimes is the goal.20 
This tension between international criminal justice and national interests 
highlights a larger question related to international legalism, independent international 
institutions and sovereignty. In the case of international justice, some argue that in order 
“to vindicate international norms effectively” international justice institutions must be 
structured for “impartiality, expertise and political independence.” These considerations 
must be weighed against “sovereignty costs” of diminished national autonomy. 21 But 
despite the legalist restraints put upon governments by their obligations under 
international law, an examination of the case studies in this thesis will demonstrate that 
under most conditions, states still act according to their interests notwithstanding liberal 
assertions to the contrary. 
The international community is not about to abandon the principles of 
sovereignty. At a December 2001 address at the Peace Palace in the Hague, Pierre 
Prosper, the State Department’s Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues asserted 
that the “international practice should be to support sovereign states seeking justice 
domestically when it is feasible and would be credible…International tribunals are not 
and should not be the courts of first redress, but of last resort.”22 He went on to remind 
the audience that the even the ICTs have concurrent, not just primary, jurisdiction with 
states over the crimes that they are authorized to prosecute.23 The principle of 
complementarity enshrined in the ICC statute is further evidence that the international 
community has not allowed the concept of sovereignty to fully erode.  
States are not about to hand over responsibility for the prosecution of crimes, to 
an international body without good reason. “To allow its own nationals or aliens charged 
with the commission of crimes on its territory to be prosecuted by a distant international 
tribunal would deprive the state of control and suggest the inadequacy of its legal 
                                                 
20 Sewell, p. xi. See also Charney, Progress, p. 455. 
21 Abbott, p. 375. 
22 Pierre Richard Prosper, “Address at the Peace Palace in The Hague,” December 19, 2001, 
<http://www.state.gov/s/wci/rls/rm/8053.htm>  (Feb 13, 2003) 
23 Ibid. 
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system.”24 But the international community may have to step in especially where states 
fail to uphold the rule of law. “Where no action or insufficient action is taken at the 
national level (as in the case of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda), the obligation falls 
upon the international community…Since maintaining the rule of law is a good in itself, 
the quasi-moral obligation to uphold the rule of law falls upon the State, in the first 
instance, and then upon the international community.”25 Moreover, states may find it 
expedient to have the international community prosecute cases for them due either to 
political sensitivity or due to the lack of capacity to prosecute on their own. 26 But as Neil 
Kritz points out “if the state is relieved of the need to face these issues, leaving them to 
be handled and concluded by outsiders (and therefore easily disowned by local leaders if 
that becomes politically expedient), then the experience may contribute less to a durable 
peace and the entrenchment of the rule of law.”27 
The international community can assert jurisdiction over perpetrators of 
international crime in sovereign states several ways. First, the Security Council may 
make a determination that there has been a threat to international peace and security 
under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. The ICTs and international assistance to courts in 
East Timor and Kosovo were set up under this method. By contrast, in Sierra Leone and 
Cambodia, the mixed tribunals were set up pursuant to agreements between the Security 
Council and the host governments.28  
The Security Council has vested the ICTY and ICTR with the authority to 
demand the production of suspects from the Balkans and for African states where 
                                                 
24 Jonathon Charney, “International Criminal Law and the Role of Domestic Courts,” American 
Journal of International Law, Volume 95, Issue 1, (January 2001) 120-124.122. 
25 Campbell, p. 633-34. 
26 Charney, International Criminal Law, p. 122. “In some circumstances, a state may find it in its 
interest to allow a prosecution to go forward before the ICC, considering the matter too dangerous to be 
handled domestically and preferring trial before a distant international tribunal. In other situations, the state 
may not be capable of properly prosecuting an international criminal matter.” 
27 Neil Kritz,, “The Rule of Law in the Postconflict Phase,” in Crocker, Chester A., Hampson, Fen 
Osler, and Aall, Pamela (eds.), Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict, 
United States Institute of Peace Press, New York, 2001, p. 817. 
28 Rolf Ekeus, “New Challenges for the United Nations,” in Turbulent Peace, p. 521. In the case of the 
ICTR, the Security Council made a controversial move by asserting jurisdiction over conduct that occurred 
totally within the sovereign state of Rwanda. The use of this principle, humanitarian intervention, was also 
used to justify NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999. However, this concept seems to be at odds with the 
UN’s principle of non-interference and it will remain to be seen how these precedents will be used in the 
future. 
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criminals have taken refuge. A provision in the ICC statute gives the Court the option of 
requesting that the Security Council gives similar authority to the ICC when states will 
not comply with their obligations under treaty or when the accused is the citizen of a non-
party state. However, since the United States and China are opposed to both the ICC and 
toward jurisdiction over non-party citizens, it is difficult to see how this provision will be 
implemented. 
The second way the international community can assert jurisdiction is through 
treaty obligation. An example would be an extradition treaty. Under the ICC statute, state 
parties have explicitly agreed that the ICC can make a determination that a state party 
cannot or will not investigate and or prosecute a suspected international criminal. This 
treaty provision gives the ICC a deep reach into the sovereign territory of the states 
party.29 Similarly, an invitation by a government for the international community to assist 
in rebuilding a post-conflict society may well indeed involve the granting of powers to 
prosecute international criminals. For example, Sierra Leone has voluntarily opted to 
open up its legal system to international assistance. The final way for the international 
community to assert jurisdiction is through universal jurisdiction.  
The citizens of the post-conflict state and the perpetrators home countries will 
question legitimacy of assertions of jurisdiction by international tribunals over 
international crimes. Even when such an action is judged legal under international law, 
the action may still not be considered legitimate and a backlash against the international 
community may develop.  
Issues related to the exercise or infringements of state sovereignty are only some 
of the challenges that face the international community in post-conflict justice. Once a 
tribunal is formed and comes into existence, it will have to effectively prosecute 
international crime without exacerbating the underlying conflict. It will also need to gain 
and maintain the support of the international community and the post-conflict state in 
enforcing international criminal law. Even more daunting are the challenges of rebuilding 
the capacity of the state to conduct justice in accordance with international standards and 
                                                 
29 Marc Grossman, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, “American Foreign Policy and the 
International Court: Remarks to the Center for Strategic and International Studies,” United States 
Department of State, Washington, DC May 6, 2002 <http://www.state.gov/p/9949pf.htm>, (February 13, 
2003). 
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adhere to the rule of law. These post-conflict judicial institutions need to be able to not 
only apply international criminal justice norms, but they also need to be able to build 
upon them. 
5. Evaluating Post-Conflict Justice Institutions  
The post-conflict judicial institutions represented in the subsequent chapters will 
be evaluated on their effectiveness at building legal capacity, developing international 
criminal law and maintaining support for post-conflict justice. Capacity building can be 
gauged in two ways. First an institution or approach can be evaluated on how well it 
helps build the tangible components of a legal system. Tasks here may include the 
training of lawyers and judges, and the building of infrastructure and the development of 
laws and procedures that meet international standards. The second part of capacity 
building, the transfer of international legal norms into the local legal culture, is softer, but 
just as important. A long-term effect of these institutions should be to advance the 
international legal norms that allow a state to conducts its legal proceeding pursuant to 
the rule of law. Indicia of the normative transfer should include: independent judiciaries, 
fair trials and rules that reflect fundamental fairness in criminal proceedings.  
These post-conflict justice institutions also have an ability to make an impact on 
the overall development of international criminal law through the prosecutions. 
Developments can be made through case law, procedural practice, and relations with 
international bodies and states or by the fact that the international community has agreed 
to the establishment of the institution in the first place. 
Support for these institutions depends to a degree on their ability to cooperate 
with the international community, and the post-conflict states that are the institutional 
focus. Support can be measured by maintaining independence from interests that run 
counter to the mission of the institution and the ability to get the international community 
and donor states to back the enforcement of the institution’s authority with funding, legal 
resources and military power. 
Even when post-conflict tribunals are set up or have demanded compliance from a 
state, group or individual, the tribunal itself has very little in the way of enforcement 
powers. The ability of the tribunal to impose its will depends a great deal on the political 
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will of the international community and the degree of political, economic and military 
force that states will use to support the institution for the enforcement. 
6. Conclusion 
Post-conflict judicial institutions are an essential element of post-conflict 
reconstruction because they address the most egregious abuses of international law 
committed dur ing armed conflicts and promote a growing global consensus about human 
rights and the rule of law. The question to be addressed in subsequent chapters is: how 
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II. UNILATERAL APPROACHES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines institutions that operate solely on the international level 
without any coordinated efforts or mechanisms on the state level. These institutions will 
first be evaluated on several criteria to determine if they are working and why. These 
criterion are: the ability to positively impact the development of legal capacity in the 
post-conflict state thereby transferring international legal norms to the post-conflict state, 
the ability of these approaches to contribute to the growing corpus of international law, 
and their ability to gain and maintain the support of the international community and 
post-conflict states. This exercise will help identify the major advantages and problems 
with each approach. The analysis will determine if the approaches are truly effective in 
providing and institutionalizing long-term commitment to international legal norms or if 
the approaches are superficial and subject to politicization and marginalization. 
 
B. INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS AND UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 
1. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
Currently, there are two types of international criminal tribunals (ICTs) 
functioning to prosecute international crimes. The current ad hoc ICTs are the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) located in The Hague, 
Netherlands and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) located in 
Arusha, Tanzania. The second type of international tribunal is the International Criminal 
Court (ICC). This tribunal, also located in The Hague is still in the formation stage, but 
will have a much wider scope and jurisdiction than that of the ad hoc tribunals. Finally, 
some national courts have used universal jurisdiction to indict and prosecute individuals 
for international crimes that had no nexus to the trial venue.30 
                                                 
30 Meron, p. 464.Progress made in the Hague and Arusha through case law and lessons learned, have 
greatly influenced the legal foundations for the ICC. Judge Meron, the current president of the ICTY’s 
Judicial Chambers, suggests that there is “a synergistic relationship among the statutes, of the international 
criminal tribunals, the jurisprudence of the Hague Tribunal, the growth of customary law, its acceptance by 
states, and their readiness to prosecute offenders under the principle of universality of jurisdiction.” He 
points out that rulings from the ICTY, “clearly helped to create the environment for some of the 
developments in the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court.”  
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The ICTs were set up relatively quickly and started to deal with complex 
international war crimes investigations in situations where the national level authorities 
had little capability or control. The Security Council Resolutions authorizing the ICTs 
directed member states to comply with demands by the tribunals.31 In theory then, these 
tribunals should have the full force and effect of the United Nations. But such backing 
can come at a price. The ICTs have in turn been criticized for being tools of the Security 
Council, and for being costly, timely and inefficient (by member of the Security Council). 
Institutionally, the ICTs have been charged with mismanagement, lack of 
professionalism, inefficiency, cost overruns, and with being too slow in the prosecution 
of cases.32 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 827 established the ICTY in May 
1993. It was set up quickly, due in part to the existence of the International Law 
Commission work that had been ongoing since the 1940s to set up an international 
criminal court.33 The initial purpose of the ICTY was to prosecute cases arising out of the 
conflict in the former Yugoslavia between 1991 and 1995, but it later took jurisdiction 
over cases arising out of the internal conflict between Serbia and ethnic Albanians in 
Kosovo during 1998-99.  
Now in its eleventh year, the ICTY is not envisioned to finish its work until at 
least 2007 although some observers have estimated that cases could still be working 
through the appeals process until as late as 2016.34 Since 1993, the ICTY has indicted 
seventy-five suspects and has completed trial proceedings against thirty-seven of them.  
                                                 
31 Paul Tavernier, “The Experience of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia 
and for Rwanda,” International Review of the Red Cross, No. 321, Dec 31, 1997, pp. 605-621, 606. 
<http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteen0.nsf/iwpList197/A84C98727641A195C1256B66005…>, (December 
11, 2002) 
32 Pierre-Richard Prosper, Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, “UN International Criminal 
Tribunals for Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia: Statement before the House International Relations 
Committee,” February 28, 2002, <http://www.state.gov/s/wci/rls/rm/2002/8571.htm> (Feb 13, 2003). See 
also Human Rights Watch, “Justice for Iraq” These charges have led to reviews of the ICTs by the United 
Nations and a recognition that future ad hoc ICTs, and mixed tribunals will incorporate lessons that will 
ensure more effective and efficient proceedings. For example, future ICTs will probably have time limits 
put on them similar to the mandate for the Special Court in Sierra Leone. 
33 William Schabas, “International Law and Response to Conflict,” in Turbulent Peace, p. 611. 
34 Prosper testimony, Feb 28, 2002. See also Daryl A. Mundis, “Improving the Operation and 
Functioning of the International Criminal Tribunals,” American Journal of International Law, Vol 94, Issue 
4 (Oct., 2000), 759-773, 770-771. 
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Currently, eights suspects including former Serbian president, Slobodan Milosevic are on 
trial in the tribunal’s three trial chambers.35 
a.  Analysis of Effectiveness 
1. Capacity Building. Until recently, the ICTY had no programs 
designed to bolster judicial capacity in post-conflict states. Very belatedly and probably 
in response to calls from the United States for a better division of labor between the 
ICTY and national courts, the ICTY has become involved in capacity building in Bosnia 
and the Republic of Srpska. The Bosnia Court for war crimes will operate under the 
Office of the High Representative (OHR), the international body created to administer the 
post-conflict reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina by the Dayton Accords, and involve a 
combination of international and national lawyers and judges. This scheme is based on a 
need to alleviate a huge caseload, speed the administration of justice and to bring the face 
of justice back to Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is too early to evaluate these initiatives, but 
some observers are concerned that the budgetary resources and political will do not exist 
to make these courts successful.36 
 Exclusive of these recent initiatives by the Court, the capacity 
building efforts that have taken place in the former Yugoslav republics have been in spite 
of the ICTY, not because of it. Post-conflict judicial capacity initiatives have been 
motivated first, by efforts to pre-empt ICTY prosecutions and second by judicial reforms 
mandated by conditionality requirements imposed by western powers such as the United 
States and the European Union. Both the US and EU have required states like Croatia, 
Serbia and Macedonia to institute judicial reform in order to qualify for further funding, 
assistance, and future participation in organizations such as the EU and NATO.37 In this 
                                                 
35 United Nations, “Fact Sheet on ICTY Proceedings,” Update: 2 June 2003, 
<http://www.un.org/icty/glance/procfact-e.htm>, and United Nations, “Public Indictments,” Update 2 June 
2003, <http://www.un.org/icty/glance/indictlist-e.htm>, (June 5, 2003). The ICTY can handle up to nine 
trials at a time. Its trial chambers each have at least three trial panels that hear cases. 
36 Anes Alic, “Reinventing the Hague,” January 21, 2003, Transitions Online, from Lexis -Nexis 
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sense, capacity building has, in part, been a defensive emulation of the judicial systems 
familiar in the developed states of Europe and North America. 
 Since these capacity building efforts have been undertaken in order 
to thwart the ICTY and to meet short-term conditionality, it may be proper to question 
how deeply the new judicial structures have operationalized international legal norms. 
Included in these norms is the deterrent effect that strong judiciaries have under the rule 
of law. Courts in all of the former Yugoslav countries have been criticized for politicized 
verdicts, especially when the accused is seen as either a war hero or as a war villian. 
Additionally, both local prosecutions and the ICTY failed to stop the war in Bosnia from 
1993-95, including the massacre at Srebrenica, and failed to prevent Serbian forces from 
committing atrocities in Kosovo during 1998-99. Furthermore a direct warning by the 
prosecutor to Serb President Slobodan Milosevic did not deter him from carrying out his 
aggressive campaigns.38  
 The ICTY has only recently sponsored the establishment of locally 
run war crimes courts in Bosnia, but capacity building has been mostly undertaken in 
order to either pre-empt the court or to satisfy other international interests. The normative 
impact of this capacity has mitigated some nationalism and marginalized some 
politicians, but has not been truly accepted by the parties to the conflict. These factors 
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indicate that the emulative capacity building and normative change may be superficial 
endeavors and will not be fully operationalized after the international focus has moved. 
2. Development of International Criminal Law.  The development 
of international criminal law has been the main strength of the ICTY. The legacy of the 
court includes: the expansion of international criminal law into new areas of the law, the 
definition of the jurisdiction of the court as an institution, and finally the practice of 
procedural international criminal law. Specifically, the ICTY expanded the application of 
the Geneva Conventions, further developed the doctrine of command responsibility, and 
for the first time established rape as a form of torture and a crime against humanity. 39 
 The Tadiç case allowed the ICTY to expand its jurisdiction into 
cases that many had asserted were outside the scope of international humanitarian law. 
According to Justice Richard Goldstone, the first prosecutor for the ICTY, the Appeals 
Court in the Tadiç decision made it clear that the distinction between international and 
internal conflicts could not be sustained.40 This decision had huge implications for 
international humanitarian law, international criminal justice, state sovereignty and for 
the Court itself. Indeed, the Court validated its own lawful establishment by the Security 
Council, and the primacy of its rulings over those of courts in the former Yugoslavia. 
Significantly, “the judges confirmed that customary international law no longer requires 
any connection between crimes against humanity and armed conflict of any character.”41  
 Finally, through the practice of international criminal law since 
1993, the ICTY, has made significant advances in procedural international criminal 
law.42 These advances in substantive and procedural international criminal law have been 
credited with creating an environment that led to developments for the ICC.43 Moreover, 
these practices have helped shape the structure and procedure for other international 
tribunal such as the ICTR and the Special Court for Sierra Leone. 
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3. Support for the ICTY.  The ICTY needs the support of the 
United Nations (the international community in general, but the Security Council 
members and other European states specifically) and the cooperation of the former 
republics of Yugoslavia to be effective. According to the ICTY, support and cooperation 
are vital for the collection of evidence the detention and transfer of detainees and the 
contribution of personnel and financial resources.44 Moreover, the Court needs the 
political, economic and sometimes military power of the international community in 
order to carry out its mandate and it needs the support and cooperation of the post-
conflict states in order to meet the challenges of capacity building, and the development 
of international criminal law. 
 Despite the initial enthusiasm by the international community for 
the tribunal, real support in the forms of funding, resources and enforcement mechanisms 
were slow in coming.45 NATO, the multinational force tasked with securing the peace in 
Bosnia was extremely hesitant to take on the mission of arresting indicted war criminals 
out of the fear that it would divert resources from peacekeeping and put the lives of the 
peacekeepers at risk. Security Council members were similarly reluctant to provide 
adequate resources to the Court in the early years. However, the activism by the 
prosecutor and the chief judge as well as the indictments (and marginalization) of several 
key Bosnian Serb leaders made Western powers see the ICTY as yet anothe r tool to use 
against the Bosnian Serb government to stop the war.46 Only then did resources begin to 
flow and significant progress begin to be made in the arrest and prosecution of indicted 
war criminals. 
 The ICTY has grown from a relatively small operation with a 1994 
budget of $11 million to a large international bureaucracy with a 2002-2003 budget of 
over $223 million and 1248 staff members.47 This growth has led to charges of 
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costliness, mismanagement and inefficiency. The international donor community and the 
United States in particular forced the United Nations to appoint expert review panels and 
external auditors to provide oversight. Additionally, the United States led the charge to 
set definitive time limits on the operation of the court in order to force it to streamline its 
procedures and shorten its tenure.48  
 Politically, the international community has used “conditionality,” 
as described above, to force Croatia the Republic of Srpska and Yugoslavia and 
Macedonia to perform certain tasks including judicial reform and cooperation with the 
ICTY. While this support has not contributed to the effectiveness of the Court, in 
building capacity, it has ensured that these states have actively cooperated with the 
ICTY.49 Militarily, the Western powers leading the NATO/SFOR mission have not used 
their forces in Bosnia for the systematic round up 50 of indicted war criminals. SFOR has 
pointed out that the Dayton Accords make the arrest of indictees a “local responsibility” 
and have balked at pursuing some of the highest ranking and most powerful figures such 
as Karadzic and Mladic for fear of undermining the peacekeeping mission. 51 This is a 
clear signal that the international community does not see itself bound by decisions of the 
Court. 
 Support for the ICTY in former Yugoslavia communities has also 
been problematic. War criminals are still at large, often with the complicity of the vast 
majority of citizens who see many of these figures as war heroes. Until 1999, the ICTY 
did little to reach out to the local communities. In fact, it was not until early 2000 that UN 
press releases on the court’s proceedings were even translated into Serbo-Croatian. Now 
the ICTY has an office in Sarajevo that conducts educational seminars, coordinates visits 
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for the court personnel and works with local media to stimulate interest in the tribunal. 52 
Since the start of the trials limited televised proceedings have been provided to viewers in 
the Balkans, but the proceedings in The Hague are not dramatic, they are slow moving 
and procedurally oriented, remote in time and place, and slowed even more by 
simultaneous translation. 53 In short, the trials make for bad TV. 
 Outreach has been a glaring weakness for the court. Some 
commentators have charged that the ICTY has failed in “delivering believable justice to 
Balkan societies and encouraging them to critically examine the recent past.”54 The 
criminalization of men who are considered patriots without an effective outreach program 
that explains why the leaders but not the followers are war criminals leads to a sort of 
“collective guilt” in direct contravention to the norm of individual guilt that the Court is 
trying to establish. 55 Thus, the outreach failure has contributed to a sense of apathy about 
the court in the Netherlands and a low level of national support. A 1997 poll revealed that 
less than 6 per cent of the population in Bosnia saw the prosecution of war criminals as 
urgent.56 
 Similarly, despite requirements imposed by conditionality, for 
domestic political reasons, national governments have been disinterested in arresting and 
extraditing war criminals. For example, in Croatia, the 2002 indictment of suspected war 
criminal, General Janko Bobetko created a backlash against the ICTY. Up to eighty per 
cent of the population supported a government decision not to extradite the general and 
legally challenge the indictment.57 Moreover, while international conditionality has led to 
somewhat greater cooperation with the Court, in Serbia, Bosnia and the Republic of 
Srpska, parties actively opposed to the ICTY have had strong showings in recent 
elections.58 
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Domestic resistance to the ICTY has, as mentioned earlier, 
prompted governments in the former Yugoslavia to develop legal capacity in an effort to 
pre-empt the ICTY. Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia have all taken measures to prosecute war 
criminals on their own terms. Serbia has even established its own Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission to investigate the events of the 1990s.59 
b.  Conclusions 
 Overall, the ICTY has proved that “international investigations and 
prosecutions of persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian 
law are possible and credible.”60 However, it has not been directly effective in building 
up the legal or normative capacity by the states of the former Yugoslavia. This imbalance 
means that the Court has addressed the symptoms of the conflict but has not done its part 
to assist the former belligerents in building structures, such as the rule of law, that will 
help the belligerents solve the underlying causes of the conflict. 
 Moves intended to preempt the Court and to satisfy donor conditionality 
have affected capacity building, but are unlikely to maintain their strength after the ICTY 
has finished its work. National and international efforts have been exclusive of the ICTY, 
only under pressure from an international community fed up with the slow processing of 
cases in The Hague, the Court has made a more proactive effort to develop local capacity 
to prosecute international crimes.  
 Yet outreach programs are still not a priority for the Court. The 
international community has taken the lead in supporting indigenous efforts as part of a 
larger post-conflict reconstruction effort and has made cooperation with the ICTY a basis 
of conditionality for the aid and assistance that these states need to develop and 
reintegrate into the community of nations. Thus some capacity building has been 
accomplished despite, not because of, the ICTY. 
 The ICTY has been most effective in developing a body of international 
criminal law. Yet the advancements by the ICTY have had little direct impact on the 
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former Yugoslavia and were unable to prevent the violence that tore into Serbia and 
Kosovo in 1999, six years after the Court was founded.  
 Rather than lending political, economic and military support for the 
purposes of serving the interests of international justice, the international community has 
used the ICTY as a tool to enforce overall change on the Balkan states. The United States 
and the EU have used compliance with the Court as a condition for continued economic 
and military aid as well as the allure of membership in political, economic and military 
arrangements. 
 Domestic support for the ICTY in the former Yugoslavia is problematic 
due to support for indicted war criminals and the desire to preserve sovereignty. The 
ICTY has failed to actively engage the governments and populations of the region in 
order to demonstrate that it serves the interests of the people and governments by 
punishing the individuals who were most respons ible for starting and continuing the 
brutal wars that destroyed their societies. 
 Yet the ICTY set the stage for other efforts to fulfill the Nuremberg 
legacy. The case of the ICTY is instructive for present and future tribunals. Its  
development of law, workings as an international bureaucracy, and experiences, positive 
and negative, in gaining and maintaining the support of the international community and 
post-conflict states have foreshadowed the founding of a truly international criminal court 
as well as its alternatives. 
2. International Criminal Court (ICC) 
The treaty underlying the International Criminal Court, the Rome Statute, was 
adopted by the vote of the international community in 1998 and signed and ratified by 
individual governments over the next four years. The seat of the ICC will be The Hague, 
Netherlands in the tradition of the ICTY and the International Court of Justice. Currently, 
the ICC has jurisdiction over states that have ratified the treaty and over individuals who 
are either citizens of those states (party states) or who have committed international 
crimes in the territory of a state party. At this writing the ICC has not begun to prosecute 
individuals even though its temporal jurisdiction took effect on July 1st 2002. 
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As a forum for international criminal justice, the ICC could serve the interests of 
the international community by promoting an international rule of law that will hold 
individuals accountable for their actions without allowing them to hide behind 
sovereignty or sovereign immunity. The ICC could also serve the interests of states by 
setting standards for the international community in the form of practices and norms. The 
ICC’s complementarity provisions and ability to develop and transfer international norms 
could force nations to ensure that their judicial institutions meet international standards of 
due process and fundamental fairness. Thus the ICC could be effective in supporting 
local capacity building, transferring international legal norms, and developing 
international criminal law. However, the ICC’s limited jurisdictional reach and its focus 
on punishing past crimes but not enabling states to build deal with future ones is likely to 
subject the Court to many of the same problems that have plagued the ICTY. 
a.  Analysis of Effectiveness 
1. Capacity Building. The ICC is designed to promote local 
capacity building by means of a threat of usurpation. The Rome Statute uses a concept 
called complementarity that gives the ICC the discretion to intervene in the domestic 
affairs of party states when it judges that a state cannot or will not prosecute an offense 
punishable under the Statute. Thus complementarity is intended to force party states to 
ensure that their legal systems meet international standards so that the ICC does not usurp 
jurisdiction. According to Jonathon Charney, complementarity will stimulate states to 
take action against their citizens because, “[i]n most situations, states find it more 
desirable to resolve a matter domestically than to surrender responsibility to an 
international body.”61 However, the mere fact that international norms are available, and 
complementarity provisions provide incentives to adopt them, means little to states that 
lack the resources, personnel and capacity to operationalize those concepts.62  
 If there is potential for the ICC to set standards that will transform 
legal norms in states, there is no indication that the ICC has a formal outreach program to 
work with states to build capacity to operate under the rule of law. Moreover, states that 
cannot pursue war criminals today will be equally unable to do so after the ICC has 
                                                 
61 Charney, International Criminal Law, p. 122. 
62 Kritz, p. 816. 
34 
stepped in. Indeed, even as the ICC prosecutes a few leaders, the great bulk of 
perpetrators, if prosecuted at all, will face whatever national justice system is left in the 
state whether it adheres to international legal norms or not. In some cases, perpetrators 
will be able to escape justice because of influence or the threat of violence, but in other 
cases, the system will simply be incapable of holding everyone accountable. As Neil 
Kritz, who has written extensively on the rule of law in post-conflict environments has 
pointed out, “[p]utting all of the hundreds and sometimes thousands of such individuals 
on trial, whether before a local or international court, would be financially, politically, 
and logistically untenable.”63 
 Despite the absence of formal capacity building programs, 
supporters of the ICC have speculated that the complementarity provisions, the incidental 
experience gained by international staff and the mere existence of an international 
criminal court will help states develop legal norms that meet international standards. The 
problem with this assertion is that it is currently only theoretical and the experiences of 
the ICTs suggest that such an influence may be a long-term project instead of a short-
term effect. Like the ICTY, the ICC will treat the symptoms but not the underlying 
disease. 
2. Development of International Criminal Law. Despite the 
potential issues with capacity building, the ICC, as the first standing international 
criminal court, has the potential to make continuous progress in the development of 
international criminal law. Even during the Preparatory Commission meetings 
developments including the “Elements of Crimes” were introduced which will, for the 
first time in international criminal law, elaborate the definitions of crimes in the Statute.64 
Thus even before the ICC begins to operate, it has affected the development of 
international criminal law. Further, once the Court does begin to hear cases and make 
rulings the case law will carry weight for the state parties and will serve as persuasive 
authority for others. These rulings and developments will most likely become part of 
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customary international law for states that do not recognize the court now, but make no 
move to register their objections to rulings. 
3. Support for the ICC. The ICC has the support of the majority of 
the states in the international community. However, it support and therefore ability to be 
an effective international institution is limited in two key ways. First, the ICC does not 
have the support of the UN Security Council because two Council members, the United 
States and China, will not sign on as members. Second, the jurisdiction of the ICC is 
limited to party states and does not extend to non-party states where international crimes 
are more likely to take place. Additionally, since the ICC has not opened its proceedings 
or tested its authority, its support amongst party states and its ability to dictate 
compliance when it decides to exercise its powers under complementarity remain 
unknown. 
 The opposition to the ICC by several states, including the United 
States, relates to the powers of the ICC vis-à-vis the Security Council. Pursuant to the 
Rome Statute, the ICC can work with the Security Council, but it does not answer to the 
Security Council in the exercise of its discretion to investigate, indict or prosecute 
individuals for international crime. This independence has caused the United States to see 
the ICC as susceptible to politicization and thus a forum where American military 
officers and policy makers will be continuously subject to politically motivated 
complaints. Additionally, the United States sees the Rome Statute, as drawn, as limiting 
the ability of states to conduct diplomatic affairs.65  
 While legal experts will debate the merits of the United States’ 
assertions, the fact remains that the ICC will not be able to rely on the Security Council 
or US foreign policy to enforce its decisions. Moreover, the United States has taken 
active steps under the American Servicemembers Protection Act to ensure that party 
states to the ICC will not turn American military officers over to the Court in case of 
indictment for an act that otherwise falls under the Rome Statute.66 
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 When the ICC does start formal proceedings, it may also find 
domestic support problems similar to those found by the ICTY. Complementarity will 
certainly be a contentious issue and will stimulate resistance as well as capacity building. 
The lack of a formal outreach program will similarly undermine the ICC’s ability to 
demonstrate that it is trying to serve the interests of the local community while 
investigating and prosecuting international crimes. 
 Furthermore, as it stands up and grows into its role as an 
international institution, the Court will face its own capacity problems. Lessons learned 
from ICTs show that caseloads, multinational investigations and the management of 
budgets are always going to be a challenge. Yet instead of focusing on one or several 
countries like the ICTs currently do, the problems for the ICC will be amplified on a 
worldwide scale with a multiplicity of languages and a multiplicity of agendas. 
Procedurally, the ICC will follow the lead of the ICTs in being time consuming, costly, 
and requiring an ever growing international bureaucracy.  
b. Conclusions 
 The ICC will not correct the deficiencies of the ICTs for several reasons. 
First, while the complementarity provisions may force party states to emulate courts on 
the international level or those in developed states, an essential element – a capacity 
building program – is still missing. States parties that lack the capacity to prosecute 
international crimes will lose jurisdiction to the ICC, but will not be assisted in the 
development of the needed capacity to carry on further or later prosecutions that meet 
international standards. Moreover, with jurisdiction over one hundred states, the ICC will 
not have the capacity to carry out large scale and continuous prosecutions in single states. 
Second, the lack of an outreach program for capacity building or at least education will 
limit the ability of the ICC to inform subject populations about the mission of the Court 
and the important international legal norms that it represents. The ICC will expend on the 
groundwork laid down by the ICTs in the development of international criminal law. Yet 
while it has the potential to set new international legal standards and norms, they will 
only have an indirect influence absent a proactive program of developmental assistance in 
the judicial sector. 
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 Unfortunately the ICC will not fully serve the interests of the international 
community and may only partially serve the interests of the state parties. The Rome 
Conference, by not working with the United States and other major powers members to 
get a better consensus on the relationship between the ICC and the Security Council 
sacrificed power for the ideal of global justice. While advocates of the universal justice 
hope that these powers eventually change their opinion and join the Court, the reality is 
that the ability of the ICC to have its orders enforced will be circumscribed. Therefore the 
effectiveness of the Court has been limited before it has had an opportunity to hear its 
first case. Even when the Court does begin to operate, the absence of capacity building 
and outreach programs will limit the effectiveness of the institution. For state parties, 
especially those with low capacity, substandard legal norms, and little tradition with the 
rule of law, a formal capacity building program would be far superior to the trickle down 
effect that some advocates of the Court are hoping for.  
 The ICC envisioned by legalists has not been established. The Court has 
stood up as an institution with limited jurisdiction and without the membership of three 
permanent members of the Security Council.67 Therefore, the institution established to 
promote the achievement of universal justice lacks the power base needed to effectively 
carry out its mission making it questionable whether the ICC as it stands fully serves 
anyone’s interests.  
3. Universal Jurisdiction 
States have used universal jurisdiction to exercise authority over certain crimes 
(including international crimes) that are so heinous by their nature, that any state has the 
jurisdiction to open proceedings against an accused even if the accused or the crime in 
question have no relation to the state that is bringing the action. In 1993 Belgium passed 
a law that allowed domestic courts to use universal jurisdiction to prosecute crimes 
against humanity, and genocide.68 During its early years, human rights advocates and 
atrocity victims seeking to prosecute perpetrators used this law to indict over twenty-five 
individuals including seven political figures. Belgium and Switzerland have convicted 
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some Rwandans for their conduct during the genocide and have indicted others such as 
Iraqi officials for crimes against their own citizens. Courts in Senegal, Spain and the 
United Kingdom have also recognized this legal principle. In fact, international 
movements to establish guidelines for the use of universal jurisdiction have paralleled 
efforts to establish the ICC.69 
 
a.  Analysis of Effectiveness 
1. Capacity Building. Universal jurisdiction is not an institution but 
a concept. Thus individual states, and more specifically, their court systems can use the 
concept to pursue international criminals. However, there is neither a coordinating body 
for universal jurisdiction nor are there programs to build legal capacity in states where the 
accused are located. The best-case scenario for states with low capacity or lack of 
political will to prosecute cases is to have some citizens or foreign governments seize 
upon universal jurisdiction and bring cases in places like Belgium where the courts are 
sympathetic. Moreover, countries that have universal jurisdiction laws often have 
proactive human rights organizations that promote adherence to international criminal 
law. 
 Even if a state that was applying universal jurisdiction broadly had 
the full support and cooperation of the international community, its ability to operate and 
apply universal norms would be limited by the capacity to prosecute all the cases that 
came from a post-conflict state(s) and by the fact that criminal investigators are still 
limited by jurisdiction. The practical logistics of trying cases where the actors, crime 
scenes, victims, witnesses and evidence is far away and often inaccessible limits the use 
of universal jurisdiction as anything but a last resort for the international community. A 
“consequence  of  Belgium’s universal  jurisdiction  law is  that  the  courts  have  been 
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inundated with suits filed by victims of atrocities, who are seeking a forum for redress of 
their grievances. The potential cost of investigation and litigation of these cases is 
staggering.”70 
 Belgian prosecutions, the adoption of what are known as the 
Princeton Principles of Universal Jurisdiction and a high profile case brought by a 
Spanish judge against the former president of Chile, Augusto Pinochet have served to 
transfer international norms in the sense that there is an increasing awareness of universal 
justice among citizens of states where governments and other groups have committed 
wide scale and systematic violations of international criminal law. The prosecutions and 
results are often merely symbolic, but there have been several cases where individuals 
have been brought to justice. However, in those cases the defendants are typically low-
level perpetrators who have wandered into the jurisdiction of a state like Belgium or 
Switzerland, not the persons most responsible for large-scale international crimes. 
2. Development of International Criminal Law. Universal 
jurisdiction has been most successful in the development of international law. The 
aforementioned Princeton Principles were adopted in 2001 after a yearlong effort by 
international legal experts trying to establish guidelines for the responsible use of 
universal jurisdiction as a “potent weapon” against perpetrators.71 These principles 
encourage courts to use universal jurisdiction, but only as long as they observe 
international legal norms such as due process and other safeguards.72 Belgian and French 
cases have helped define the limits of sovereign immunity.73 NGOs have tried to hold 
states to their treaty obligations (e.g. obligations under the genocide convention) and in 
cases such as the Pinochet case or the Belgian indictment of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel 
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Sharon,74 domestic courts using universal jurisdiction have been able to get their 
governments to take actions that the foreign ministries would not have recommended. By 
using their constitutional powers to force their governments to act, activist judges have 
expanded the scope and reach of the law. 
 Due to the limited jurisdiction of the ICC and other special and ad 
hoc ICTs, universal jurisdiction still has an important role to play in international 
criminal law. Significantly, these developments have paralleled the creation of the ICC, 
recognition that international tribunals have distinct limitations and will not always be 
effective in bringing actions against those most responsible for international crimes. 
3. Support for Universal Jurisdiction. Universal jurisdiction can be 
an effective weapon against war criminals especially when the accused is a low level 
perpetrator and comes from obscure regimes in the developing world. However, 
indictments under the Belgian law have caused a political backlash in certain cases when 
they have been directed against sitting heads of state such as Ariel Sharon or military 
officers such as American General Tommy Franks. In the past few years, complaints 
have been lodged against the first President Bush, and American generals Colin Powell, 
Norman Schwarzkopf, and Franks. As a result, The United States has pressured Belgium 
to amend its universal jurisdiction law. 75 In response, the Belgian government has made 
changes that will require complainants to have a direct link between themselves and 
crimes alleged.76 This reaction is not just an attempt to mollify and angry hegemon. 
Politicization has concerned universal jurisdiction advocates who are concerned that the 
use “against weak and vulnerable countries…can create unenforceable claims and 
discredit the process.”77 
 Because universal jurisdiction works on a unilateral basis and does 
not always have the full support of the state whose courts take jurisdiction over a crime, 
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the chances that the international community will put its full economic, political and 
military weight behind an indictment would depend on whether the international 
community had an interest in arresting the suspect or if in the situation with Pinochet, 
states are hemmed in by extradition treaty obligations and are forced to take action under 
their own domestic law.  
 Like other international criminal justice institutions, universal 
jurisdiction needs international support to be effective. Universal jurisdiction has no basis 
to make changes within countries and states that have had their citizens indicted by courts 
in Belgium have been non-cooperative and outright hostile to the exercise of jurisdiction 
by those courts. Israel has been critical of Belgium,78 the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo has brought a case before the ICJ in response to a Belgian warrant against the 
sitting Minister of Foreign Affairs,79 and The United States even threatened the removal 
of NATO if the underlying law was not changed.80 
b.  Conclusions 
 Universal justice is most effective in developing legal rules and norms that 
raise awareness of the abuse and impunity that exists in the world. However, universal 
jurisdiction by itself has no effect on the ability of states to develop a capacity to adopt 
international legal norms or live under the rule of law. 
Overall, universal jurisdiction has assisted the international community in 
the sense that it has kept the spirit of international criminal law alive in the absence of 
other forums. It has given victims of abusive regimes and rebel groups an outlet where 
they can establish their claims on the record for the world to see. Practically, universal 
jurisdiction is at best a second player to the more recently developed international forums 
and is particularly susceptible to political maneuvering as the Belgian case demonstrates. 
4. Conclusion 
Unilateral international judicial institutions, and universal jurisdiction, described 
above are consistently effective at developing and strengthening the corpus of 
international criminal law. The ICTY took an early and aggressive lead to expand the 
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boundaries of international humanitarian law and human rights law into the area of 
internal conflict. These gains were incorporated into the Rome Statute of the ICC. 
Additional advances made during the formation of the Statute capitalized and streamlined 
a formerly unwieldy body of law. The institution of universal jurisdiction has also 
contributed to the development of international criminal law by defining the limits of 
sovereign immunity for state leaders and serving as a last resort for victims of 
international crimes. 
Yet these approaches do not envision a long-term commitment to legal capacity 
transferring international legal norms to ensure that a post-conflict state would develop 
and operate pursuant to the rule of law. Recent efforts by the ICTY have recognized the 
need to incorporate the state level actors, however, this initiative is in response to an 
overwhelming case load and pressures to clear the docket within the next five years, not a 
recognition of the essential role that legal capacity building plays in the overall post-
conflict reconstruction process. The ICC has failed to grasp this fact, hoping that 
complementarity will force party states to emulate the structures and norms used by more 
developed states that operate under the rule of law. 
The developments in international criminal law that have been initiated or 
implemented by these approaches mean that more international criminals will be held 
accountable for their actions and that impunity is no longer guaranteed. Moreover, the 
international community has discovered that it can use these developments to enforce 
cooperation and reform through conditionality. International and domestic courts have 
already seized upon these advances to force governments and international organizations 
to respect obligations under international and domestic law. More importantly, 
developments such as the ICC have caused divisions on the international level that will 
have affects that go far beyond the prosecution of international crimes. 
While support does exist for international criminal justice, the international 
community as a whole has failed to support the unrestricted use international institutions 
and the unlimited exercise of universal justice. The reasons lie in the fact that overly 
legalistic institutions threaten the concept of sovereignty and limit the ability of states and 
international institutions such as the United Nations (and the Security Council) to conduct 
international relations and to act in their interests. When these legal tools serve the 
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interests of major international powers, they can be effective in addressing past abuses 
and punishing international criminals. However, because they are designed to serve the 
international community and not the states over which they operate, these institutions are 
effective at developing international law, but not in building the capacity and transferring 
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III. MULTILEVEL APPROACHES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The approaches to post-conflict justice explored in the previous chapters focused 
on cases where the international community has acted unilaterally. This chapter deals 
with cases where the international efforts have been supplemented by or combined with 
national level institutions. The three cases examined here are fundamentally different 
from each other in practice, but they all share a hybrid character in that state and 
international level efforts are simultaneously working to address international crimes. 
This chapter explores the benefits of including state level actors in the post-conflict 
judicial process and whether the post-conflict judicial institutions can avoid the 
politicization that helped lead to conflict in the first place, and the tendency to focus on 
the single-minded pursuit of international criminals without considering the practical 
effects that the process has on the post-conflict state and the post-conflict reconstruction 
process and a whole. 
B. RWANDA 
1. Introduction 
In Rwanda, three separate post-conflict justice institutions deal with international 
crimes connected with the genocide in 1994. At the international level, the ICTR, located 
in Arusha, Tanzania is focused on the prosecution of those most responsible for the 
genocide. At the state level, the national courts have assumed jurisdiction over more than 
one hundred thousand genocide suspects that the ICTR will not pursue. Due to obvious 
capacity problems, the Rwandan government recently revived and adapted a traditional 
community based process called gacaca, which will process the vast majority of the 
national level cases. These institutions have a workable, but informal, division of labor 
but the overall system remains fragmented due to lack of coordination and cooperation 
between the international and national levels. 
The division of labor in the three-pronged approach resulted from default, not 
design. The Security Council established the ICTR soon after the genocide took place, 
but it only focused on seventy to eighty high- level officials in the former Rwandese 
government and other individuals who were deemed most responsible. The new Rwandan 
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government on the other hand, indicated immediately that it was going to prosecute 
individuals for their roles in the killings, but because of the large number of offenders, 
had to categorize the level of responsibility to ensure that certain individuals were tried 
before the national courts. After several years, the government decided to utilize a 
modified form of community conflict resolution, called gacaca courts, to process the vast 
bulk of cases. The ICTR and Rwanda do not have any formal memorandum of 
understanding that delineates the division of labor, and disputes have arisen over the 
prosecution of military officers that the current Rwandan government seeks to either 
protect or prosecute on its own terms. 
2. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 
The ICTR was established in 1994 in Arusha, Tanzania in the wake of the 
genocide that claimed over 800,000 lives. Modeled after the ICTY, the ICTR’s mandate 
is more restricted in time and space. Whereas the republics of the former Yugoslavia 
were still at war, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) had won a clear victory. Further, 
unlike Yugoslavia, where national courts were, until recently, unlikely venues for 
bringing cases against individuals for international crimes, the Rwanda government 
demanded action against the perpetrators. 
Since 1995, the Court has completed only ten trials out of a total of seventy 
indictments.81 Set up pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 955, the ICTR has 
primary jurisdiction over the commission of acts of genocide committed in Rwanda 
between January and December 1994. The Court is focused only on bringing those most 
respons ible for the genocide to justice and therefore does not have plans to prosecute 
many more than the seventy already indicted. 
a.  Analysis of Effectiveness 
1. Capacity Building. The ICTR has no programs designed to bring 
Court prosecutors, judges, investiga tors or administrators together with their Rwandan 
counterparts in order to build a mentoring relationship. Unlike the case of Yugoslavia, the 
Rwandans took the initiative and started their prosecutions before the ICTR did. While 
Arusha’s legal capacity in terms of facilities, resources and experienced personnel far 
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exceeds that of Rwanda’s courts, the ICTR has not instituted any bilateral programs or 
lobbied the international community designed to encourage the Rwandan courts to 
emulate the international tribunals or the courts systems of more advanced democracies. 
In fact, the Court has passed on proposals to hold some proceedings in Kigali, the 
Rwandan capital that would serve as a model for Rwandan jurists. 
 If at all, the ICTR has tried to infuse international norms into the 
post-conflict judicial process in only a general way by setting an example of how to 
conduct tribunals that adhere to principles of fairness and due process. However, because 
the ICTR is remote to Rwandans in terms of distance and relevant connections to justice, 
the transfer of international norms from the court to Rwanda has been minimal. Even 
then, the example being set is ambiguous because the trials have moved at an extremely 
slow pace, the accused have been treated to a standard of living in detention that most 
Rwandans would envy and witnesses have not been afforded adequate protection after 
testifying. Moreover, almost nine years after the crimes took place the ICTR still does not 
have an effective outreach program to engage the citizens of Rwanda who are the 
victims, witnesses and perpetrators of the crimes being prosecuted in Arusha.82 
2. Development of International Criminal Law. Despite its slow 
progress, the ICTR has made some important advances in international criminal law. 
Significantly, the ICTR can claim the first conviction for genocide, the first conviction of 
a state official for genocide and the establishment of rape as a method of genocide.83 
Additionally, the rules of procedure for the Court have been adopted as the basis for the 
rules that will be used by the Special Court in Sierra Leone. However, the ICTR is also 
providing negative lessons for future unilateral or mixed international tribunals due to its 
slow progress and inability to engage supporters on the international and post-conflict 
state levels. 
3. Support for the ICTR. International support for the Court is 
largely rhetorical and moral. Notwithstanding its roots, the ICTR is not effectively 
supported or utilized by the UNSC or its members who seem to have interests in Central 
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Africa. Moreover, with its slow progress, especially as compared to the under-resourced 
national courts, many in the international community and in Rwanda see the ICTR as 
mismanaged, corrupt and a waste of money. Indeed, the ICTR has failed to process its 
caseload efficiently. The international community, Security Council members in 
particular, has taken issue with the lack of progress and mismanagement that have 
plagued the court over the past nine years. The United States has been one of the 
strongest critics of the court and one of the loudest voices in urging the ICTR to finish its 
trial work by 2008.84 
 These same voices have urged Rwanda to cooperate with the Court 
but thus far, have not used the conditionality that was crucial to success in the former 
Yugoslav republics. There are several reasons why this may be the case. First, there is a 
residual guilt complex by countries that failed to intervene in the genocide. Therefore, the 
Rwandan government claims a moral position that has been difficult to assail. Second, 
the Rwandan government has been remarkably strong, stable, and even somewhat liberal 
at times since 1994, three characteristics that are rarely found in Central African 
governments. Consequently, the onus has been on the ICTR to establish a cooperative 
relationship with Rwanda, not the other way around.  
 Ambassador Prosper, himself a former prosecutor for the ICTR, 
has called on the Court to establish “clear guidelines” with the Rwandan government 
relating to the division of labor between the two levels. The US position has been that it 
and other nations would continue to provide resources including the extradition of wanted 
persons located within their territory to the court. However, he stressed the need for the 
ICTR to improve management of the court and increase the pace of trials.85 
 Significantly, the international community has not forced the 
Rwandan government to cooperate with the ICTR through conditionality, nor has it used 
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the ICTR actively to deter conduct by the Rwandan and other regional governments in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo by expanding its mandate. In fact, the limited 
mandate itself indicates a relatively low level of international support. The former issue 
may be linked to the Court’s institutional problems and a need to support the Tutsi led 
government in Kigali. The latter issue may be related to the reluctance of the Security 
Council to give another ICT an open mandate in terms of time and money. 
 ICTR itself suffers from capacity problems. It is historically short 
of resources and has a high turnover rate for personnel. More importantly, the ICTR also 
lacks the capacity to connect with the Rwandan people in a way that allows it to be a 
meaningful expression of international justice for them. Several reasons stand out: first, 
the location of the court in Arusha essentially means that international justice is foreign 
justice; second, the accused and defense attorneys in Arusha live much better than the 
vast majority of Rwandans and seem to be soaking up funds that Rwandans think could 
be better spent on them; third, ICTR has done little in the way of public relations and 
outreach; finally, ICTR staff members and investigators have shown a high degree of 
insensitivity and lack of cultural awareness while dealing with the victims of the 
genocide.86 In fact, some ICTR staff see themselves as serving the international 
community as a whole instead of the people of Rwanda. 
 A key area of contention between Rwanda and the ICTR is the 
prosecution of Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) leaders for their conduct during the 
offensive that stopped the genocide. Allegations of international crimes against these 
individuals have led to six indictments by the ICTR, but the Rwandan government insists 
that the ICTR should only prosecute genocide cases and leave cases related to the 
RPF/RPA to domestic jurisdiction. The issue came to a head in mid 2002 when the ICTR 
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complained to the Security Council that the dispute had led to non-cooperation from 
Rwanda in the areas of witness and documentary production. 87  
b.  Conclusions 
 The ICTR has been ineffective in building judicial capacity or transferring 
international norms to Rwanda because it is more focused on prosecuting a limited 
number of individuals and helping to develop international criminal law. There has never 
been an effort made to integrate the Court into a post-conflict reconciliation process, or 
build capacity. As for the transfer of international norms, the ICTR is located hundreds of 
miles away, but has no outreach program to inform Rwandans about the important work 
being done in Arusha. The Court has made some contributions to the development if 
international criminal law, but those developments have not improved the ability or 
capacity of Rwanda to implement post-conflict justice. 
 The ICTR has been ineffective in building the capacity of the Rwandan 
judicial system and transferring norms of international legal practice to the indigenous 
legal system. Instead, it has left those tasks to other members of the international 
community, while focusing on developing international law. The divergence between the 
aims of the international tribunal and the national government has hurt the overall post-
conflict justice and reconciliation effort. With proper coordination, the ICTR could be a 
positive influence on the national courts, gacaca and possibly the Rwandan government 
itself. Yet instead of acting as a mentor, the ICTR has taken on the role of an adversary. 88 
The international community has focused on clearing the remaining caseloads and urging 
the ICTR to work with Rwanda, not on supporting the primacy of the Court or making it 
more effective in helping Rwandans. Rwandan support for the ICTR is slim and at this 
point, the international community is not willing to force compliance with the Court. This 
lack of support is a direct result of the ICTR’s failure to engage the victims of the 
genocide and support a long-term post-conflict justice and reconciliation program. 
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 The ICTR has failed to transfer international norms of post-conflict justice 
and reconciliation, help build local legal capacity and infuse international law into the 
operations of the post-conflict judicial institutions at work in Rwanda. The main reasons 
for this situation is because Rwanda took the early lead in prosecutions, using assistance 
that will be detailed below, the Court did not make capacity building an objective and the 
international community has not used conditionality to force Rwanda to emulate the 
ICTR. While it has had some successes in developing the law and has worked to achieve 
justice in some cases, it has fallen short of turning itself into a model of how an ICT (or 
even ICC) could effectively work with judicial institutions in post-conflict states. In fact, 
the lessons for future ICTs are generally negative.  
 The ICTR has failed partly because it has not gained or maintained real 
international or national support. The failure to gain and maintain real international 
support stems from its slow progress and poor administration, which in turn led the 
international community to limit the mandate to Rwanda in order to avoid an open-ended 
institution in Central Africa. The consequence is that the Court has not been able to 
impose its will on Rwanda and has not acted as a deterrent to violence in that region since 
1994. The failure to gain support with Rwandese flows from a focus on prosecuting a 
limited number of international crimes to the exclusion of the needs and concerns of the 
people of Rwanda. This alienation has led to misunderstandings between the ICTR and 
Rwandese and perceptions that post-conflict justice is not being carried out in their 
interests. 
3. National Courts 
Rwanda’s national courts have a broader scope than the ICTR seeking to punish 
acts of genocide from 1990 through 1994. The Rwandan genocide law is codified under 
Organic Law no. 08/96 on the Organization and Prosecutions for Offenses Constituting 
Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity Committed since October 1, 1990.89 Under the 
law there are four categories of accused, with those in category one, which numbers over 
2,000 considered to have been the leaders and most culpable for the genocide. “Category 
One consists of genocide planners, organizers, supervisors and rape offenders including 
sexual torture. Category Two includes instigators and perpetrators of serious attacks with 
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intention to kill. Category Three consists of accomplices in serious crimes (short of rape 
and murder) without intention to kill. Category Four consists of those who looted and/or 
destroyed property.”90 Since national level prosecutions started in 1996, the special 
chambers, created within the national courts have processed hundreds of cases.91 
However, these courts are hamstrung by capacity problems, are subject to political 
influence and have not consistently maintained international standards of fairness and due 
process. 
a.  Analysis of Effectiveness 
1. Capacity Building. As previously noted, Rwandan courts had to 
rebuild from scratch after the genocide in 1994. When the trials began in 1996, 
international efforts in the form of funding and experienced lawyers helped strengthen the 
capacity of the Rwandan courts to conduct proceedings that worked to comply with 
international standards. In fact, the capacity building efforts mandated by the need to 
prosecute thousands of genocide suspects have done more to rehabilitate the judicial 
system than anything else, including the ICTR. Although adherence to international 
standards continues to be a problem, the courts are continuously increasing their efforts to 
observe those norms.92 Individual donor countries and NGOs have taken the initiative to 
work with the Rwandan criminal justice system to ensure that it develops the capacity to 
work effectively and within the bounds of internationally accepted standards. 
 Unfortunately, huge caseloads and lack of resources and trained 
personnel means that abuses and shortcomings still occur throughout the system. 
Instances of corruption, politicization, and lack of judicial independence have 
underscored the fact that the Rwandan courts still lack the norms required for consistent 
and sustained effectiveness under the rule of law. 93 Yet, the courts in particular, have 
made progress as prosecutors, judges and other members of the criminal justice system 
become more habituated to the system and gain more experience. Efforts are continuous. 
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As late as March of 2002, the donor community was still sponsoring workshops in Kigali 
on topics such as judicial independence and ethics, court administration, and legal 
training.94 
 The Rwandan system is working to comply with international law, 
but lack of training and experience on the investigative, prosecutorial, defense and 
judiciary means that international legal norms are not being fully observed. Still, the 
independent international efforts to bolster the capacity of these courts mean that the 
Rwandan courts are continuously increasing the capacity to be able to meet universal 
standards. However, because of the hundreds of thousands of individuals who have been 
detained on genocide charges, it would take the Rwanda courts over four hundred years 
to prosecute all of the cases. This lack of capacity has led the adaptation of gacaca, a 
traditional grass roots level conflict resolution, to process the large number of cases. In 
turn, the use of gacaca has meant given the Rwandan courts the necessary breathing 
space needed to develop indigenous legal capacity that can effectively apply the rule of 
law. 
2. Development of International Criminal Law. The Rwandan 
national courts have not made any contribution to the body of international law. Genocide 
prosecutions have been conducted pursuant to domestic law, not the legal mechanisms 
designed for Arusha. Yet the fact that Rwanda was able to develop a judicial capacity and 
begin prosecutions that continuously worked to comply with international legal norms 
can be viewed as an important precedent for future post-conflict states. 
3. Support for National Courts. National courts in Rwanda enjoy 
clear international support. For example, donors such as the United States believe that 
support to these courts is necessary to resolve the large number of genocide cases, 
therefore it and other international donors have supported the capacity building efforts 
through rule of law programs. France, Belgium, Canada, and the United States all have 
assistance programs operating in Kigali.95 
Rwandans also recognize the need to establish accountability for the 
genocide. In fact, many Rwandans want their own courts to have the primary role in 
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prosecuting genocide cases. Even perpetrators who are sitting in prisons are in favor of a 
speedy and fair judicial process “so that those who are guilty can be punished and those 
who are innocent can be freed and have their names cleared.”96 They are willing to 
support the national courts and the gacaca system in order to put the genocide behind 
them and resolve the thousands of cases that remain. The government itself wants to 
resolve the cases in order to get through the backlog of outstanding cases and ease 
overcrowded prison conditions. Thus, national courts have attracted significant national 
and international support. The continued efforts by the national government, NGOs, and 
the donor communities to improve the quality of the judicial system provides a favorable 
indication that support for the judicial system will be sustained after the genocide cases 
are cleared and that the courts will operate pursuant to the rule of law. 
b.  Conclusions 
 The inherent lack of experience and resources combined with the 
overwhelming number of cases means that the Rwandan Courts will not be able to 
effectively develop capacity and a tradition of compliance with the rule of law without 
the continued and sustained efforts of the Rwandan government and the international 
community. Capacity in this case focuses on prosecuting the genocide cases and having 
the residual capacity to operate effectively according to international legal norms. It does 
not mean the capacity to prosecute over one hundred thousand cases. Yet the 
international community has to continue to deliver support in the form of money and 
technical assistance indefinitely in order to ensure an effective and independent judicial 
system that complies with international legal norms. National support is there and will 
continue to grow as the national courts demonstrate that they can deliver fair justice 
instead of ethnically driven decisions. Currently, the national courts are working within 
their capacity due to the existence of gacaca, which has given these courts the vital space 
needed to establish themselves. 
4. Gacaca 
Despite a greater ability to process cases than the ICTR, by May of 1998 Rwanda 
realized that it needed an alternate mechanism to deal with the extraordinary overload 
resulting from the detention of so many genocide suspects. The mechanism selected was 
                                                 
96 Mironko, p. 12. 
55 
gacaca. Gacaca had traditionally been used at the village level to settle minor disputes, 
but had been on the wane in the decades prior to the genocide. After the genocide, 
administrative gacaca was revived to help settle village level conflicts due to the lack of 
legal capacity.  The objectives of genocide gacaca in this instance are: to establish the 
truth of what happened during the genocide; to speed up genocide trials; to eradicate the 
culture of impunity; and to reconstruct Rwandan society. 97   The project took off in 2001 
when Rwandans elected over 200,000 judges to sit in over 9000 gacaca courts 
nationwide. Pilot programs were conducted throughout 2002 and received favorable 
support. The remaining gacaca courts are starting to operate nationwide.98 Gacaca will 
not be used to prosecute Category One offenders, however it will deal with category 2, 
which includes acts that would be punishable under international criminal law. Thus in 
addition to the ICTR and national courts, gacaca will deal directly with international 
crimes. 
a.  Analysis of Effectiveness 
1. Capacity Building. Gacaca does not build legal capacity in 
Rwanda or transfer international legal norms. Instead, gacaca is a response and a solution 
to the extraordinary, but temporary, capacity problems facing the Rwandan courts. The 
ambitious program has the potential to process all the genocide cases in only a few years 
compared with the estimated one to four hundred years that it would take the domestic 
courts to carry out their mandate.99 The government has already released over 40,000 
prisoners to their villages who will live in their communities until the gacaca courts can 
resolve their cases.100 However, international standards will be hard to implement and 
maintain because of the informal nature of the forum and the lack of education amongst 
the more than 200,000 gacaca judges. Once the genocide cases have been resolved, 
Rwanda will have a more advanced form of a traditional community based conflict 
resolution mechanism. 
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 The gacaca system does not adhere to international legal norms, 
but NGOs and the international community are willing to overlook most deficiencies if 
certain minimal standards are met and human rights are protected.101 There is a 
consensus that the gacaca system does not meet international standards, but human rights 
groups have demanded improvements to the system, not the abolishment of gacaca.102 
However, the outcry over the lack of adherence to international standards is tempered by 
the recognition that gacaca is the only way that Rwanda will be able to conduct 
proceedings against suspected perpetrators, bring as sense of justice to the communities, 
alleviate overcrowded prison conditions and help set Rwanda society on the road to 
reconciliation and beyond. 
2. Development of International Criminal Law. As a national 
institution that has been criticized for its lack of adherence to international legal norms, 
gacaca does not contribute to the development of international law in the same way as 
ICTs or the ICC. However, gacaca does present the international community with an 
example of community based conflict resolution that can augment other judicial efforts at 
the international and national levels. The gacaca example is valuable to the international 
legal community because it shows that traditional conflict resolution institutions can 
foster community reconciliation and punish low-level offenders while offering minimal 
standards of international criminal law. 
3. Support for Gacaca. Despite some reservations, the international 
community has financially supported the gacaca because it is the only feasible way to 
process the one hundred thousand plus cases against genocide defendants. The support is 
subject to some specific concerns regarding the rights of the accused and the perception 
that the gacaca system will be viewed as victor’s justice. However, gacaca is seen as 
essential for the post-conflict justice process and the reconciliation of Rwandan society. 
 In Rwanda, the transfer of the bulk of the genocide cases over to 
the gacaca system has been positively received. In a survey conducted during the pilot 
phase of the program in 2002, “about 92 percent of the general population find Gacaca as 
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a viable remedy to the culture of impunity, a mediation and reconciliation tool, as well as 
a key to a new phase in country-wide development.”103 Yet, while members of the Hutu 
ethnic group, which makes up most of the population, support the gacaca courts as a 
means of returning to normalcy, they generally feel that the system treats them differently 
from the minority Tutsi. Gacaca courts will not try cases where Hutus were killed by the 
RPA during its offensive. These complaints are raised at gacaca meetings, but officials 
insist that only normal courts can handle such crimes.104 
b.  Conclusions 
 Gacaca is an imperfect solution to the capacity problems facing Rwandan 
courts, yet it has become an essential and potentially effective component of post-conflict 
justice and reconciliation in Rwanda. Both the international community and Rwandans 
are willing to overlook flaws in the gacaca system because there is no other viable 
alternative to establishing truth and accountability for the 1994 genocide. Moreover, the 
gacaca system may serve as an example of traditional conflict resolution or alternate 
dispute resolution that can be used in other post-conflict environments as an augment to 
judicial systems with low capacity. 
5. Conclusion 
The three-pronged approach that has resulted in Rwanda has worked in spite of 
itself for several reasons. First, despite the flaws in each prong, capacity building is 
taking place at the national level that promises to infuse the international legal norms that 
will allow Rwanda to effectively operate under the rule of law. Although there are some 
problems, the national courts are operating, they are holding genocide perpetrators 
accountable and they are continuously working to improve their performance. Moreover, 
the ICTR has made developments in international criminal law and the gacaca courts 
have demonstrated that it is possible to hold large numbers of perpetrators accountable 
for their actions even in the face of huge capacity shortfalls. 
Yet, the Rwanda approach would be much more effective if it was integrated. 
Cooperation and coordination between the ICTR and the Rwandan government would 
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give the international and national components a larger stake in the eventual outcome and 
ensure that the accused were accorded the same treatment. Moreover a joint enterprise 
would allow the Rwandans to see the process take place in a way that included them and 
allow the ICTR to exercise a mentoring influence over the government and courts in 
Rwanda. A more integrated approach would also make it easier for the international 
community to use the ICTR as an instrument to promote cooperation and the rule of law 
within Rwanda and in other parts of Central Africa that still suffer from the conditions 
that led to the 1994 genocide. By not integrating the ICTR has lost opportunities to get 
better cooperation from witnesses and has allowed a perception to grow that money spent 
on the Court in Arusha is denying Rwandans of funds and resources that could be used 
more effectively in Rwanda. 
C. EAST TIMOR 
In 1999, the population of East Timor voted to secede from Indonesia in a U.N. 
sponsored plebiscite. During the violence that followed, the physical infrastructure of 
East Timor was destroyed and thousands of people killed. After the violence had 
subsided Indonesian troops and militias that had committed international crimes pulled 
back to West Timor. Peacekeepers, relief workers and UN personnel found that the 
capacity of the new quasi –state was in utter ruins with no ability to bring those 
individuals to justice. 
Pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1272, the United Nations Mission in 
East Timor (UNTAET) was formed to take over executive, legislative and judicial 
functions for the failed state. Included in the new judicial scheme were four district courts 
and a court of appeals. Within the Dili District Court system there are two Special Panels 
consisting of both East Timorese and international judges that have exclusive jurisdiction 
over international crimes committed in East Timor between January 1 and October 25, 
1999.105 By December 2002, the Special Panels had indicted over 140 and had convicted 
thirty-one individuals for their commission of international crimes in 1999.106 
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UNTAET and the Special Panels will be examined together as a model of a mixed 
tribunal. Since UNTAET has stood in as the sovereign and its subordinate organ the  
Special Panels is the venue for the prosecution of international crimes, they can be 
considered to be working on both the international and national levels. As a post-conflict 
justice institution, the Special Panels have international experts and judges working 
within the domestic legal system with East Timorese lawyers and judges. The Panels 
have been recruiting, educating and training these East Timorese to eventually replace all 
international personnel currently assigned there. 
Overall, the Special Pane ls have shown themselves to be an effective model for 
post-conflict justice that has been able to set up a functioning system to address violations 
of international criminal law. From the start UNTAET recognized the need for local 
lawyers who could serve as prosecutors, judges and defense attorneys. Special care was 
taken to legitimize and take away all political implications of prosecutorial and judicial 
appointments. A five-member commission, with East Timorese membership, was 
established to vet potential jurists.107 However, identifying those who had qualifications 
was a difficult task because “Under Indonesian rule, no East Timorese had been 
appointed to judicial or prosecutorial office.” The few lawyers who remained lacked any 
relevant experience with the administration of justice or the practical application of the 
criminal law. 108 
Selection judges and prosecutors were sworn in by January 2000. Further 
appointments have followed and UNTAET has implemented a three tiered training 
program that goes beyond technical and practical skills and fosters an appreciation of the 
crucial role of the judiciary in society and the benefits of a culture of law. This last point 
is especially important in East Timor, a “society that had never before experienced 
respect for the rule of law, and in which the law was widely perceived as yet another 
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instrument for wielding authority and control over the individual, the meaning of 
independence and impartiality of the judiciary had to be imparted gradually.”109 
1.  Analysis of Effectiveness 
a.  Capacity Building 
 When the Indonesian authorities departed all the administrative and 
political cadres left as well. Therefore, UNTAET was not faced with an entrenched elite 
whose interests would potentially clash with the UN transitional authorities. High on 
UNTAET’s list of tasks was establishing law and order in order to provide security for 
the East Timorese and to collect evidence of past crimes.110  
UNTAET’s efforts to develop laws, lawyers, and institutions have been 
matched by progress in reestablishing public administration, the police and the formation 
of the armed forces.111 Long-term challenges for UNTAET and its successor United 
Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) include ensuring that capacity is 
strengthened and sustained even after the projected stand down of UNMISET and its 
Special Crimes Investigations Unit (SCIU).112 
In the selection of indigenous legal experts, special care was taken to 
legitimize and take away all political implications of prosecutorial and judicial 
appointments. In order to avoid accusations of favoritism, “the establishment of [an] 
independent judicial commission became the primary mechanism for the selection of 
judges and prosecutors and served as an important safeguard for the establishment of an 
independent and impartial judiciary.”113 The five-member commission was headed by an 
East Timorese and included two international legal experts. However, identifying those 
who had qualifications was a difficult task because the mass exodus of Indonesians had 
stripped East Timor of judges, prosecutors, and law clerks. 114 
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The commission used a rigorous interview and selection process to 
identify judges and prosecutors who were sworn in by January 2000. Further appointment 
have followed and UNTAET has implemented an aggressive three tiered training 
program that goes beyond technical and practical skills and fosters an appreciation of the 
crucial role of the judiciary in society and the benefits of a culture of law. This last point 
is crucial because since East Timor was a “society that had never before experienced 
respect for the rule of law, and in which the law was widely perceived as yet another 
instrument for wielding authority and control over the individual, the meaning of 
independence and impartiality of the judiciary had to be imparted gradually.”115 
The indigenous legal community still lacks education, training, and 
experience. Specific problems with the Special Panels include: insufficient numbers of 
trial judges and a non-functioning court of appeals; inadequate trial transcripts and 
translation services; lack of support services and resources for judges; inadequate 
professional training for the judiciary; and a need for added resources and qualified 
personnel for the defense bar.116 Moreover, detainees and accused have had their rights 
infringed upon because of a lack of lawyers, facilities and adherence to international 
human rights standards.117 These shortcomings are unsurprising given the relatively short 
time that these institutions have been operating, the remote location of East Timor for 
international legal experts, and the difficulty of keeping the international community 
focused on the needs of a post-conflict state once attention is shifted to a new crisis or 
region. 
Yet, UNTAET’s monopoly over the legal system and its domination of the 
Special Panels has greatly facilitated the transfer of international legal norms to the East 
Timorese legal and judicial systems. UNTAET accomplished this task three ways. First, 
it developed a legal framework based on both local norms and international law. Second, 
it identified and trained individuals to work with, and eventually take over, the system. 
Finally, it a situation reminiscent of gacaca in Rwanda, UNTAET set up an independent 
truth commission to facilitate reconciliation and help ease the burden of cases facing the 
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embryonic legal system. 118 Established over a year after the Special Panels, the 
Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor has been vested with 
a mandate to establish the truth regarding the commission of human rights abuses and 
may grant immunity from prosecution for specific categories of crimes, although not for 
international crimes.119 
b.  Development of International Criminal Law 
 The Special Panels are helping to develop international law in two ways. 
First, the Special Panels demonstrate that the United Nations can successfully take direct 
control of a state’s judicial system in order to develop indigenous capacity and to 
prosecute international crimes. 120 Second, the Special Panels have set a precedent by 
using the Rome Statute in place of an organic legal system.121 The practical lessons 
learned from putting the statute into practice will be invaluable when the ICC begins to 
hear cases. The Special Panel’s process of interpreting rules and flushing out the 
mechanics of the Statute will provide the ICC with a valuable preview of issues that will 
have to be addressed to make the proceedings more effective. 
c.  Support for Special Panels 
International support for the UNMISET mission and the Special Panels 
has been consistent, but is not as high as the United Nations suggests. As the Secretary-
General noted in his recent report, the international community must maintain its political 
support and do more to provide resources to the entire post-conflict peace-building effort, 
specifically including the security sector.122 The reality is that East Timor’s remoteness 
and proximity to the most populous Muslim nation make the support more rhetorical than 
actual. Throughout its mandate the UN mission “has suffered from a combination of 
inadequate resources, a shortage of experienced staff, poor management, and a lack of 
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political support.”123 Planned phasing out of the SCIU – the international investigative 
unit - before most of the cases are heard will hamper the ability of the Special Panels to 
ensure that post-conflict justice is conducted appropriately. 
UN support for Special Panels prosecutions against Indonesian officers 
has created an interesting situation between the international organization and the new 
East Timorese government. The government feels that it has to look past the UN mission 
and strike a balance between calling Indonesians to account for their crimes and building 
regional relationships. East Timorese officials have indicated that they see the 
relationship with Indonesia as too important to be derailed by international criminal 
issues.124 Yet, UNMISET appears to be willing to press cases125 and has charged seven 
Indonesian including the former armed forces chief with international crimes.126  
Nationally, support for the Special Panels remains high, but there is a 
growing sense of injustice for victims and for defendants at the Special Panels who were 
essentially just small actors in the atrocities.127 In Indonesia, sham courts and an amnesty 
law in safely shelter the individuals who are most responsible for the 1999 atrocities.128 
Moreover, the justice system in Dili seems to have been compromised in some cases by 
politically connected East Timorese who have been able to avoid prosecution for 
international crimes.129 
2. Conclusions  
The Special Panels have been effective at building legal capacity in East Timor 
that is integrated into the overall post-conflict reconstruction process. Although the legal 
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community does not yet have the capacity to operate on its own, the UNTAET and the 
Special Panels have begun the normative transfer necessary for the rule of law to be 
operationalized. The Special Panels could play a key role in the post-conflict 
reconstruction and the institutionalization of the rule of law in East Timor. However, the 
Special Panels are still too international and are not living up to their full potential 
because they lack the funding, expertise, and resources to be an effective venue for post-
conflict justice. 
The Special Panels have been effective at building legal capacity in East Timor, 
but remain heavily dependant on international support. This condition is probably 
inevitable in a situation where infrastructure, experience, capacity and resources are low 
to non-existent. As East Timorese gain experience in the legal sector, the international 
community must retain a presence that will ensure that the East Timorese courts are not 
corrupted by political concerns before they have the opportunity to internalize 
international legal norms and practices.  
The Special Panels for East Timor have provided the international community 
with a model for post-conflict justice. However, the international community has not put 
its full resources into making the model work correctly. In addition to resources 
shortfalls, practical difficulties such as the lack of indigenous legal personnel and the 
adoption of new legal codes have hampered efforts to prosecute international crimes in a 
timely and efficient manner. Compounding the funding, resource and experience 
problems is that the political will to make the Special Panels live up to their potential is 
lacking at several levels.  
Post-conflict justice and reconciliation is taking place in East Timor. That it exists 
at all is impressive. Yet, it will only work if several conditions are met. First, the East 
Timorese jurists need sustained experience with and appreciation for the rule of law. This 
means that resources, funding and international expertise will have to be expended there 
for an extended period. Second, political will has to exist that will encourage Indonesia to 
comply with its obligations to hold its people accountable. Finally, the East Timorese 
government needs to recognize that if it does not pursue the post-conflict justice and 
reconciliation process, its citizens will grow impatient with the rule of law and will begin 
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to use extrajudicial means to settle cases against those who commit international crimes. 
Recent events in Indonesia indicate that the atmosphere of impunity is not going to 
change in the near future. Therefore, the United Nations will have to sustain its assistance 
until the local prosecutions are completed and a certain level of capacity is reached that 
will perpetuate the rule of law. 
D. SIERRA LEONE 
The Special Court in Sierra Leone almost did not happen. The Lomé Peace 
Accords of July 1999, set aside plans for a court to try violations of international criminal 
law in favor of an amnesty program that promised to stop the fighting and bring 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels into the government. By October, the head of 
the RUF, Corporal Foday Sankoh moved to Freetown and took his place in the 
cabinet.130  
Unfortunately, the peace achieved at Lome did not hold, structural weakness in 
the agreement led to more fighting. In May of 2000, the new UN Force – UNAMSIL, 
established by the Security Council pursuant to the Lome Accords for security during the 
peace process, was seriously threatened by RUF attacks. With the credibility of UN 
Peacekeeping on the line, the United Nations made a plea for international support. Only 
a timely response by the United Kingdom131 salvaged UNAMSIL and the peace process 
in Sierra Leone. 
The RUF incursion was a watershed event for the justice and reconciliation 
process in Sierra Leone. GOSL with the support of the United Nations, the United States, 
the United Kingdom and the regional actors in West Africa from the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), reversed positions that they had taken at 
Lomé less than a year earlier. Instead of trading peace for justice and settling for the TRC 
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as the sole mechanism for accountability, GOSL and the international community called 
for the worst offenders of the civil war to be brought to justice.  
At that time, the Government of Sierra Leone (GOSL), requested international 
assistance in setting up a war crimes tribunal for the civil war that had devastated the 
country since 1991. However, the GOSL did not want to relinquish sovereignty to an 
international tribunal sitting in a foreign capital. It insisted that the trials be conducted in 
Sierra Leone, and Sierra Leoneans participate in the prosecutions. 
The Special Court, unlike its counterparts for Rwanda and Yugoslavia, is a hybrid 
institution created by agreement between the United Nations and the national 
government, and implemented through both a Security Council Resolution and domestic 
legislation. Its stated mission is to bring to justice to those who bear the greatest 
responsibility for violations of international humanitarian law. 132 This arrangement 
stemmed from the fact that “there was no political support for setting up another, very 
expensive, international criminal tribunal, and the Court could be established only with 
the full support and cooperation of Sierra Leone, which, in any event, wanted a mixed 
tribunal.”133 
Advantages of the Special Court include: an independent Special Prosecutor who 
has the backing of the international community; a limited three-year mandate that 
involves the GOSL134 and legal community of Sierra Leone as stakeholders; legitimacy 
and legality under Sierra Leone law; an outreach program that ensures Sierra Leoneans 
know why the Special Court has been set up and how it will work; and focused 
prosecutions against those most responsible, while delivering visible justice for the 
people of Sierra Leone.  
The Special Court handed down its first indictments in March 2003.135 The 
indictees included individuals from all sides of the conflict. Trials for the indictees in 
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custody and those who will be brought in later should begin later in 2003. However, even 
before the accused stand trial, the Special Court is starting to show itself as an 
independent actor in the post-conflict reconstruction process in Sierra Leone. The success 
of the Special Court will be evaluated through its ability to infuse international legal 
norms to the judicial system in Sierra Leone, the resulting capacity developed by these 
institutions, the adherence to international criminal law by the courts and the impact that 
the Special Court has on international criminal law. 
1. Analysis of Effectiveness 
a.  Capacity Building 
 Historically Sierra Leone had a relatively strong legal capacity. During the 
civil war judicial capacity was lost outside of the capital Freetown and a few large 
provincial towns, but the judiciary retained some independent capacity. 136  The Special 
Court has started to rebuild the capacity of the Sierra Leonean criminal justice system 
from this diminished base. Several of the judges on the Special Court are Sierra Leonean 
and the Registry and  Prosecutors offices each have Sierra Leonean staff including deputy 
prosecutors.137 Finally, the Special Court has been working to “create a defense support 
section that will include both Sierra Leonean and international lawyers.”138 This section 
will ensure that indigenous defense attorneys are capable of defending indicted 
perpetrators who might not be able to afford high priced legal counsel from Europe or 
America. 
Despite this progress, Sierra Leone still has capacity issues. In Freetown, 
trials of RUF personnel and other combatants from the post 1999 part of the conflict have 
been hampered by resource shortfalls and lack of defense counsel.139 Resources shortfalls 
and capacity problems also hinder justice in the hinterlands. Yet overall, increased 
adherence to international criminal law norms by the national courts is promising. The 
system will also be strengthened by the parallel development of the security services and 
the overall international effort aimed at social and economic development.  
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Good relations between the UN, donors, and the GOSL have facilitated 
capacity building. Preexisting cooperation between the United Nations and international 
donors in the economic, social and security realms have bolstered the Special Court’s 
capacity building in the judicial sector. British and American aid agencies have each 
assisted specific areas in the judicial sector and, the British have taken the lead in training 
the Sierra Leonean security forces and police. The British have set up the International 
Military Advisory and Training Team (IMATT) that has succeeded in restructuring the 
Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF). Additionally, the British through the 
Commonwealth Safety and Security Project have worked with UNAMSIL and local 
police to build investigative capacity. 140 These initiatives will take several more years to 
institutionalize and will require continued stability in Sierra Leone and the region to take 
hold.141 
The Special Court, as part of the overall international effort, has been able 
to transfer international norms to Sierra Leone in several ways. First, the Special Court 
has adopted an active outreach program that has built on the efforts of international 
NGOs and civil society to help understand what the court is attempting to do. Second, the  
Special Court has made an effort to work with the TRC in order to make sure that the two 
institutions complement each other and do not clash over post-conflict justice issues.142 
b.  Development of International Criminal Law 
 The Special Court has developed international criminal law in two key 
ways. First, it has built on ICTR rules and procedures while committing itself to avoiding 
the slow pace, expense and bureaucracy of the court in Arusha. The Special Court is 
taking a further step by using Sierra Leone lawyers and judges in the adaptation of the 
                                                 
140 Ibid., pp. 4-6. 
141 Current fighting in Liberia and the Ivory Coast has the potential to spill over the border of Sierra 
Leone especially since diamond-mining areas, which can provide revenue for arms, are close to the border. 
142 Mail and Guardian, “Sierra Leone: Searching for Justice,” Africa News, October 11, 2002, 
<http://web.lexis -nexis.com>, (November 2, 2002). Also a conversation between the author and Tom 
Perriello, political advisor for the Special Prosecutor, August 2002, Freetown, Sierra Leone. Cooperation 
with the TRC is  in the Special Court’s interest because due to the Lomé amnesties, most of the international 
crimes committed before July 1999 will not be addressed by a court. Currently, the Special Court maintains 
that it has the authority under Sierra Leonean law to use testimony given at the TRC for investigatory 
purposes. However, the Prosecutor’s office has indicted a preference to develop its own evidence and that 
such a move would be a last resort. 
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ICTR rules of procedure and evidence.143 Recently, the Special Court made another 
important contribution to international law by being the first post-conflict justice 
institution to indict individuals, including a sitting head of state, for the use of child 
soldiers as a violation of international humanitarian law. 144 
c.  Support for Special Court  
Perhaps the greatest advantage that the Special Court enjoys a high level 
of international and national support. Major powers and international NGOs have been 
instrumental in lobbying for and facilitating the groundwork for the Special Court. 
Moreover, the presence of the 17,000 UN forces and the willingness of states like 
Britain145 to use force to enforce the UN mandate have guaranteed that the Special Court 
has been set up for success. 
Notwithstanding the international support that created it, the Special Court 
has been effective in maintaining both international and national support for its mission. 
This support has been due to the institution’s ability to legitimize itself to the Sierra 
Leonean public, civil society, armed forces and ex-combatants. For example, the 
Prosecutor has taken opportunities to travel throughout Sierra Leone to view crimes 
scenes, meet with victims and engage civil society. In February 2003, he addressed senior 
military officers, NGOs and other GOSL officials, some of whom were concerned that 
they or their associates might be indicted, in order to explain his views and expectations. 
The Court has been proactive in maintaining that it will bring all of those persons most 
responsible for international crimes to justice no matter what group they belonged to 
during the war. The Special Prosecutor reinforced this point dramatically in March 2003 
when he indicted a sitting head of state (of another country), a former cabinet minister, 
                                                 
143 No Peace Without Justice, “Sierra Leone Mission: Narrative Status Report 2002,” April 9, 2003, 
<http://www.npwj.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=1069>, (May 22, 2003). 
144 Email to author from Tom Perriello, Political Advisor, Office of the Prosecutor, Special Court for 
Sierra Leone, dated June 11, 2003. See also SLSC – 2003- 01-I, 7 March 2003, The Special Court for 
Sierra Leone, “The Prosecutor against Charles Ghankay Taylor.” 
145 In addition to the intervention in 2000, according to Major George Cadwalader, USMC and 
Captain Felipe Paez, USMC who were in Freetown on a training mission during the time period in 
questions, an elite unit of British Gurhkas was deployed to Sierra Leone coinciding with the arrest of the 
seven indictees in February-March 2003. Phone conversations, March 2003. 
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Hinga Norman, the former leader of a pro-government militia who has close ties with the 
current GOSL, and a sitting member of Parliament.146  
The Special Court’s outreach program includes all the organs of the Court. 
The Special Prosecutor, the Registrar, the Judges and all their subordinates have visited 
with government officials, the UN, international donors, civil society, international NGOs 
and the Sierra Leonean people to explain the court and its relation to them, and to the 
TRC.147 
The GOSL is controlled by the Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP), which 
won an overwhelming victory in the May 2002 elections. The party is led by President 
Ahmed Tejan Kabbah who was elected with over 70 percent of the vote leaving Sierra 
Leone close to one party rule.148 The political situation in Sierra Leone is extremely 
complex and although the legislation enacting both the TRC and the Special Court 
maintain that they are independent bodies, the GOSL will still have informal means of 
influencing the operations of both bodies. Initially enthusiastic for the Special Court after 
the May 2000 incursion by the RUF, the SLPP dominated GOSL now has more power 
and confidence and has been dragging its feet on ensuring that the Special Court and the 
TRC are set in motion. 149  
The Special Court enjoys a high level of international support, but a 
potential obstacle to the sustained success of the TRC and Special Court is a failure of 
international resolve to sustain the broader post-conflict reconstruction process. However, 
the UN Secretary General has indicated that he will continue to encourage the Council to 
update the UNAMSIL mandate for six-month increments as the UN and its partners 
implement the post-conflict scheme. His concerns go beyond Sierra Leone to the 
containment of other conflicts in the West African region. 150  
 
                                                 
146 “ Seventeenth Report of the Secretary-General,” p. 2. 
147 It is the relationship to the TRC and its impact on the Lomé amnesties that has raised the most 
questions and concerns from Sierra Leoneans. By using an active outreach program these institutions can 
inform the population about how international norms are developing by using complementary institutions 
that will identify wrongful conduct and establish a truthful record. 
148 International Crisis Group, July 2002, p. 18. 
149 Interview with Tamir Waser, political and economic officer, US Embassy, Freetown from 8/01 to 
8/02 on 11 December 2002.. 
150 “ Seventeenth Report of the Secretary-General.” 
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2. Conclusion 
The Special Court has been effective at building indigenous legal capacity, 
transferring international legal norms and contributing to the growing body of 
international criminal law, so far. Time will tell if it can accomplish its mission within its 
three-year mandate. Its long-term effectiveness will be judged not only on its ability to 
meet its specific mission, but also on its ability to ensure that the post-conflict justice and 
reconciliation process is coordinated with the overall reconstruction process. Cooperation 
between the international and national levels including NGOs and security forces to date 
is encouraging. Unlike East Timor and Rwanda, the parties have consensus and synergy. 
However, gaps in cooperation may open up once proceedings start and real interests are 
revealed. 
The Special Court can work if the GOSL and the international community want it 
to work. So far, they have worked together, along with civil society and international 
NGOs, to set up the necessary institutions to ensure that lessons from other post-conflict 
justice efforts have been learned and mistakes are not repeated. 
Recent indictments handed out by the Prosecutor gave the actors, the Sierra 
Leonean people and the regional powers the ability to see how the Special Court was 
being received. The significance of the relative calm is heightened by the fact that 
fighting in Liberia and the Ivory Coast did not test the nerve of the Court, or the GOSL in 
carrying out their mandate.  The Special Court presents the GOSL and the international 
community with an opportunity to demonstrate how justice and reconciliation can bolster 
the post-conflict reconstruction process and help secure the policy objectives of peace on 
a national and regional scale. National and regional peace will in turn help support 
institutions building that will facilitate democratization, the protection of human rights 
and the development of free market economics. 
E. CONCLUSIONS 
The approaches described in this chapter have been successful in building 
capacity and developing international criminal law. The institutions operating in Rwanda 
have worked, but not as effectively as they could have if there was an integrated 
approach. It has had some success in developing international law but the fragmented 
approach could have ensured better long-term capacity building and deepening of 
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international norms. Conversely, the integrated approaches, used in East Timor and Sierra 
Leone, have been able to build effective institutions that will have a legacy of indigenous 
capacity. 
A lesson for future ICTs and the ICC is that the boundaries and rules of 
cooperation between the international and national levels need to be developed 
beforehand. Identifying those who will be prosecuted and where the trials will take place 
can reduce confusion and friction. Trial location, partnership programs, parity of 
sentences and many other issues need to be resolved up front. In cases such as East 
Timor, where the courts are hampered by an absolute dearth of funding, resources and 
personnel, the international community must dedicate the appropriate resources to ensure 
effectiveness. For hybrid such as the Special Court in Sierra Leone to be effective, the 
state and international community must have the political will to give the prosecutors and 
judges the support they need to make the difficult and possibly unpopular decisions. The 
recent failure of Ghana to arrest President Charles Taylor of Liberia, who was in Ghana 
when the Special Court unsealed his indictment, shows that political will is lacking in 
some quarters, especially in states that have been fortunate enough to escape conflict.151 
Yet the reaction in Sierra Leone itself has been that of overwhelming support, 
demonstrating that the Sierra Leoneans are willing to pursue the process. 
A key lesson from the case studies explored in this chapter is that for post-conflict 
justice to be effective, the international community has to recognize that national 
initiatives that will operate alongside or concurrent to the main prosecutions for 
international crimes. The international community needs to recognize that the state level 
institutions that operate will be in existence long after the international legal experts have 
come and gone. By working to transfer international norms, build residual legal capacity 
and  ensure  that  the  domestic  legal  institutions operate according to international legal 
                                                 
151 U.S. policy is that it supports the Special Court and feels that Taylor should face justice in 
Freetown. However, the State Department was unclear on what lengths the United States would go to in 
order to ensure Taylor’s presence before the Tribunal. Richard Boucher, Department of State, “Daily Press 
Briefing,” Washington, D.C., June 6, 2003, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2003/21312.htm>, (June 
13, 2003) 
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standards, the international community will leave a legal system that is effectively 
integrated into the overall post-conflict reconstruction process and better set to work 
under the rule of law. 
If set up properly, post-conflict institutions can help infuse long term stability and 
commitment to the rule of law if certain conditions are met. First, the post-conflict state 
must have a commitment to uphold the legal norms exercised by the post-conflict 
institution. Second, the international community must continue its support and recognize 
that post-conflict states need to strike a balance between the pursuit of international 
justice and other priorities such as reconciliation and alternative judicial and conflict 
resolution mechanisms that will allow perpetrators and victims to put the past behind 
them and begin the process of state building. Third, the international community and the 
post-conflict judicial institution must make post-conflict justice part of the overall post-
conflict reconstruction effort. Thus, judicial mechanisms need to be integrated into and 
synchronized with the other spheres of post conflict rebuilding. Finally, these post-
conflict judicial institutions must develop a close connection with the people of the post-
conflict state. Location of the Court in the state is important, but it is also vital to have an 
active and engaged outreach program that will inform perpetrators, victims, witnesses, 
civil society and common citizens about the workings of the Court, especially its 
commitment to punish individuals for their heinous crimes, regardless of their race, 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
A. EVALUATING POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE INSTITUTIONS 
The preceding chapters have demonstrated that post-conflict justice institutions do 
impact on liberal and realist interests. Liberal interests seek the extension of international 
criminal law that will ensure accountability and promote the rule of law. Realist interests, 
on the other hand, seek to preserve sovereignty and promote stability in the international 
order. These interests are not always balanced in the approaches discussed above. In 
some cases, the pursuit of liberal ideals has been at the expense of sovereignty and long-
term stability. Consequently, these initiatives have had limited support from powerful 
international actors and post-conflict states. In other cases, international and post-conflict 
actors have seen the utility of using these liberal approaches to further their own realist 
goals of promoting stability. This section will examine these approaches and provide a 
matrix that illustrates the relative advantages and disadvantages of each. 
1. Unilateral Approaches 
a. Advantages 
The principle advantage of the unilateral approaches described in chapter 
two is that they have driven the development and the extension of international criminal 
law over the past decade. The work of the ICTY and courts operating using universal 
jurisdiction have broken down barriers to the reach of international criminal law and have 
demonstrated that post-conflict justice does not have to mean “victor’s justice.” These 
advances, coupled with the fact that enforced cooperation with international tribunals 
could be used as a tool to compel reform in post-conflict states, make these institutions 
useful to the international community. 
b. Disadvantages 
The disadvantages of unilateral approaches flow from a primary focus on 
the international level that borders on the exclusion of local interest. First, these 
institutions have done little to nothing in terms of building the capacity of the legal 
systems in post-conflict states. In the cases examined, the venue of the tribunal is 
removed from the scene of the criminal activity and outreach programs, if they exist, are 
poorly designed and implemented. This lack of capacity building makes it hard for 
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international legal norms such as due process, judicial independence and fair trials to be 
accepted and applied. Instead, the post-conflict states have developed legal capacity for 
political reasons, to preempt international efforts or in response to pressure from Western 
conditionality. While some capacity building may be better than none at all, the aim of 
these programs is to satisfy short-term political objectives such as preemption of 
international tribunals or inclusion in international organizations. Thus, these changes 
may be cosmetic and not stimulate normative change.  
The same argument can be used against complementarity under the ICC. 
The goal of complementarity is to promote capacity building and normative growth 
through the threat of external intervention in the state legal process. Yet, while 
complementarity may force states to adopt superficial structures that satisfy the ICC, 
there is no accompanying program that will ensure that the international standards and 
concepts are ingrained in the personnel who will be operating the system. 
The second disadvantage flows from the first, namely that the lack of 
attention and focus on what is actually taking place in the post-conflict state has 
hampered the ability of these institutions to be part of a long-term solution. 
Consequently, support for these approaches in post-conflict states is low. The lack of 
support for the ICTs in Yugoslavia (and Rwanda) underscore the problems that these 
institutions face due to remoteness of the venue, lack of meaningful outreach and a focus 
on vindicating international crimes against certain individuals, without addressing the 





International support for the mission of these institutions, and for universal 
jurisdiction, is far from guaranteed. The fact that international legalists have pushed the 
ICTY and the ICC and international criminal law into the realm of international relations 
has caused some states to take pause. Although some advocates and states may see 
legalist autonomy as an advantage, powerful states, such as the United States, see a threat 
to their right to conduct international relations and work with warring parties to establish 
peace. The immediate consequence is that these ICTY found itself marginalized when it 
did not serve the interests of the United States and Western Europe. Moreover, the 
controversy between the United States and other powers over the ICC will ensure that the 
Court will never have the enforcement power of the Security Council.  In short, unilateral 
approaches can contribute to the common good of the international community (but not 









Table 1.   Post-Conflict Tribunal Typology 







ICTY Low High High Low 
ICC Low High Medium Unknown 
ICTR Low High Medium Low 
Special 
Panels 
High Medium Medium Medium 
Special 
Court 
High High High High 
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2. Multilevel Approaches 
a. Advantages 
In contrast to the unilateral approaches, the multilevel approaches bring 
several advantages to post-conflict justice at the same time. They have a demonstrable 
ability to build or rebuild legal capacity in post-conflict states, while making important 
contributions to the development and extension of international criminal law. In the 
process, they have generated a large amount of support, both internationally and within 
the post-conflict states. 
In each of the multilevel approaches studied, legal capacity in the post-
conflict state has been developed in response to the need to rebuild society and to hold 
individuals accountable for international crimes. In Rwanda, the ICTR behaved similarly 
to its sister institution in The Hague, but the national courts, with international assistance 
and augmented by gacaca were able to institute and build upon a legal system that has 
continuously worked to put international legal norms into effect. In East Timor and Sierra 
Leone, the post-conflict institutions are directly responsible for working with the post-
conflict state and the international donor community to integrate the judicial system into 
the overall post-conflict reconstruction process. These efforts have brought trial venues to 
the post-conflict state; ensured outreach programs were operating; and have worked 
closely with indigenous legal personnel to ensure that the norms and values underlying 
international justice are accepted. 
These institutional approaches have also made important contributions to 
the body of international criminal law. They have extended the reach of international law 
by making convictions for crimes such as genocide and the use of child soldiers, and they 
have also been instrumental in the development of international procedural law. 
With the exception of the ICTR (which has acted more like a unilateral 
institution), institutions in Rwanda, East Timor and Sierra Leone have enjoyed positive  
international and national support. This support is largely due to the fact that the United 
Nations and major donors have had a voice in the development of the courts and can use 
political, and economic means to withhold support. The support that these institutions 
have garnered in post-conflict states has been due to proactive measures designed to 
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reach and educate citizens about the post-conflict legal process and capacity building 
programs that help build legitimacy.  
b. Disadvantages 
The main disadvantage of multilevel approaches is the potential for 
politicization.  The interests of the institution and the post-conflict government will 
sometimes diverge, and post conflict justice may suffer as a result. In East Timor, for 
example, the new government has been reluctant to vigorously pursue international 
criminals in Indonesia due to long-term economic and security concerns. Similarly, the 
reticence of the Rwandan government to pursue RPF members accused of international 
crimes may undermine advances made by the ICTR and national courts.  This problem is 
not limited to multilevel approaches -- the ICTY has had similar difficulties arresting 
powerful war criminals -- but it is more apparent with them due to the close working 
relationships that develop with the post-conflict states.  Post-conflict institutions that 
work closely with the post-conflict state are inherently more vulnerable to being 
perceived as party to political struggles.  However, this may be an unavoidable risk if 
local capacity is to be (re)built, and post-conflict justice to endure. 
 3.  Conclusion 
Table 1 presents a summary of the effectiveness of the post-conflict justice 
institutions studied here. The table demonstrates graphically that multilevel approaches 
are consistently much more effective in building local capacity and maintaining 
international and domestic support, while still contributing moderately to the 
development of international law. Unilateral institutions have been more effective in 
expanding the reach of international law, but they have done so without engaging the 
major powers or post-conflict states, and without providing a foundation for sustainable 
justice. Ironically, by making themselves more relevant to the interests of states 
multilevel approaches also make themselves more useful to the liberal cause of global 
justice.  
B. POLICY AND CONCLUSION 
1. Policy Issues 
Decision makers who are faced with assisting in post-conflict reconstruction 
efforts need to consider a vast array of policy issues ranging from governance programs 
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to economic relief to the possible deployment of military forces. Increasingly, these 
policymakers have been urged to ensure that post-conflict justice measures to punish 
individuals for international crimes are taken. While these concerns appear to reflect 
legalist liberal values of accountability and the rule of law, they also have some practical 
aspects that may limit intrusions on sovereignty and provide for long-term security and 
stability in the conflict zone. 
These policy considerations can be broken down as follows: the importance of 
post conflict justice institutions in the post-conflict process; important considerations for 
institutional design; the costs (and savings) of post-conflict justice institutions; and the 
factors that can threaten the success of these institutions. These policy considerations 
assume that future post-conflict justice institutions will be more integrated into the post-
conflict reconstruction effort and will incorporate local capacity building programs. 
These assumptions are based on the fact that the ICTY has recently started to develop 
local capacity building projects, perhaps in response to the recognized successes of 
tribunals in East Timor and Sierra Leone. 
a.  Importance of Post-Conflict Justice Institutions 
There are several compelling reasons why post-conflict justice institutions 
are important to decision makers. The first reason is purely liberal and holds that these 
institutions can do away with impunity and punish those individuals most responsible for 
international crimes. By punishing those most responsible as individuals, the international 
community absolves groups of 'collective guilt,' and potentially halts the cycle of 
violence. There are two main realist reasons for the importance of post-conflict justice 
institutions. First, post-conflict justice institutions, by punishing those who deviate from 
international legal norms, help to stabilize the international order and make the world 
more secure. Second, the consistent and effective use of internationa lly sponsored 
tribunals will add certainty to the international order since warlords, dictators and other 
potential international criminals will be put on notice that they will be held accountable 
for their actions. These individuals will understand that even an indictment by an 
international court will make them into pariahs and marginalize them in front of their 
people and the international community. Second, post-conflict justice is cost-effective. A 
credible threat of prosecution at the Lomé conference in 1999 may have brought the RUF 
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under control sooner and would have marginalized Liberian president Charles Taylor. 
Instead, the United Nations was forced to spend billions more on peace operations, the 
international community has embarked on a multi-year rebuilding effort and fighting 
continues in Liberia, further destabilizing the entire subregion. Two recent events 
indicate that the major powers are starting to recognize this lesson. First, Charles Taylor’s 
long awaited indictment may be the key to resolving conflict in West Africa. Then, 
during a visit to the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, members of 
the Security Council stated that there would be no impunity for the atrocious crimes 
committed there.152 
b.  Considerations in Post -Conflict Justice Institutional Design 
When decision makers do agree to form an internationally sponsored 
tribunal, they must design it to validate liberal norms and serve as a tool to ensure 
stability. First of all, the tribunal must be sponsored by the international community at 
large in order to avoid a stigma of victors justice or that the court is working at the behest 
of a hegemon. Since the assumption has been made that working with the post-conflict 
state is the preferable course of action, the interna tional community must then assess the 
willingness of the state to allow the international community to take charge of the 
prosecutions. If cooperation is not anticipated or forthcoming, a more aggressive 
international court that has the backing of the international community willing to force 
compliance may be needed. Once willingness is confirmed, a base level of capacity needs 
to be established. In East Timor, the legal system was essentially non-existent, but Sierra 
Leone and the former Yugoslavia each had some capacity to build on. 
If the base capacity is known, then training and development programs can 
be designed and sectors such as the police, prisons or defense attorney training can be 
targeted for development. Of course, this process has to be integrated within the entire 
post-conflict rebuilding process where efforts aimed at governance, economic 
development and security all have elements that will overlap and coincide with the 
reform of the criminal justice sector. These capacity building initiatives have to be 
                                                 
152 “DR Congo ‘War Criminals Warned,’” BBC News, UK Edition, June 13, 2003, 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/africa/2987176.stm>, (June 14, 2003) 
82 
matched with community outreach projects that will keep the public informed and solicit 
their participation. 
In many cases, the number of potential perpetrators of international crimes 
and lesser offenses may outweigh the combined capacity of the international tribunal and 
partner courts. Examples include Rwanda, East Timor and Sierra Leone. In these cases 
fora such as gacaca and TRCs that can give conditional amnesties for non- international 
crimes are useful alternatives and have the added bonus of serving as venues for 
reconciliation and forgiveness.  
Importantly, these institutions need to focus on instilling and maintaining 
international standards, but must be able to have the flexibility to take local needs and 
concerns into consideration.  Balances must be struck between the single-minded pursuit 
of international justice and the long-term healing of the post-conflict environment. 
Moreover, while the institution must operate on a time- line that prevents it from 
becoming an inefficient international bureaucracy, it must be designed to see the post-
conflict justice process through and ensure that international legal norms have taken hold. 
c.  Costs (and Savings) of Post-Conflict Justice 
As mentioned above, international post-conflict tribunals can be cost 
effective. Although they can run into the hundreds of millions of dollars and take a 
disproportionate amount of time to conduct their proceedings, the costs are typically less 
than the deployment of thousands of troops and the relief efforts needed to stop a major 
conflict. If properly supported in terms of political will and the credible threat of military 
power, they can also deter would be criminals from continuing or initiating conflicts. In 
the long-term a properly conducted post-conflict justice process will save the post-
conflict state and the international community time, money and resources if the effort 
results in the transfusion of the rule of law and other legal norms that support democratic 
governance. 
d.  Threats to the Post-Conflict Justice Process 
The final policy consideration is ensuring adequate commitment so the 
post-conflict justice and rebuilding processes do not fail. These failures can come about 
in several ways. First, the international community may lose interest in the process, 
especially if it does not produce immediate results. The ICTR is a good example, left to 
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its own devices in Arusha; the ICTR became marked by waste, inefficiency and lack of 
effort. Due partly to these shortcomings, the international community has not used the 
ICTR as an effective tool to change policy in Central African states. Similarly, it was not 
until western policy makers realized that the ICTY could be useful that they started to 
condition aid and assistance on cooperation with the Court. 
Post-conflict justice processes can also fail when the interests of the 
international and national components diverge. This may be an inevitable consequence of 
local politics. Examples can be seen in almost every case study presented above. Post-
conflict states need to balance obligations to international tribunals with the demands of 
their constituencies. In some cases, such as the former Yugoslavia, nationalist and ethnic 
politics play a large factor in non-cooperation with the Court. In other cases, such as east 
Timor and Indonesia, powerful local interests use their influence to avoid accountability 
These types of threats to the post-conflict justice process can be anticipated and if not 
solved, then at least managed through aggressive outreach programs tha t educate the 
citizens of the post-conflict state and an overall program that synchronized with the larger 
post-conflict reconstruction process. If nothing else, the prosecutors, judges and 
administrators of the international tribunal need to pay attention to local politics while 
pursuing international the vindication and instillation of international legal norms. 
2. Conclusion 
International criminal law will continue to evolve as the various post-conflict 
justice institutions carry out their mandates and new institutions are developed. Even at 
this writing a post-conflict tribunal is being contemplated for Iraq and the details are 
being negotiated for a Special Court in Cambodia. The ICC, a dream of liberal 
institutionalists for the past sixty years has been created, but its incompatibility with 
realist interests on the Security Council means that will not be an effective post-conflict 
judicial mechanism. Thus, the international community will most likely utilize variants of 
the ICTs and mixed tribunals to address international crimes. 
Despite the marginalization of the ICC it is still in the interests (liberal and realist) 
of the international community and the major powers, in particular, to pursue post-
conflict justice. Not only will this pursuit fulfill liberal goals of addressing heinous 
international crimes, but it will also fulfill realist goals of containing threats and building 
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stability, security, and order in an anarchic world. Moreover, costs would be reduced if 
international tribunals could pose a threat to warlords and dictators and their subordinates 
who commit these offenses. The tragedy of the ICC is that it could serve both liberal and 
realist interests, albeit imperfectly, if it was a tool of the United Nations Security Council 
and had a program designed to deploy into post-conflict states in order to promote 
accountability while building capacity. 
Notwithstanding the controversy over the ICC the spirit of 1945 is alive and well 
and the Nuremberg legacy is being fulfilled. Over the past ten years, dozens of 
international criminals including heads of state, government officials, warlords, and many 
others have been either convicted or indicted for their offenses. The international 
community is addressing impunity, which reigned in many countries for most of human 
history. However, states tend to put their interests before their ideals and are only willing 
to pursue these criminals when it serves their purposes. In an age of failed states, 
terrorism and extremism, the recognition and enforcement of an international rule of law 
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